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ABSTRACT

Since the Second World War the vorld has witnessed

a gigantic

strug gle between East and West, between communismand democracy. After
t he War the European theater
struggle

was one of the main areas in 'Which this

was waged with each side seeking to extend its

bl ock the advance of the other.
could be made in resolving

The result

outstanding

was that virtually

issues

independence and sovereignty.

dom? To answer this

question

the developments in Austria
during this

ten-year

.

no progress

the re-establishment

Why then did the Soviets

policy in 1955 paving the way for Austria's

suddenly change their

it will

be necessary

The first

of
so
free-

to give an account of

and at the international

period.

and

growing out of World War II.

Thus for ten years the Soviet Union obstructed
Austria's

influence

conference

part of the thesis

table

will draw

mainly on the New York Times. the Reports of the

Q.§.. film Commissioner

for Austria,

period.

and various

books dealing

with this

Yet it is not enough to merely outline

the developments leading

the change in Soviet policy if an adequate explanation
for the shift

'Which occurred in 1955. Soviet foreign

other foreign

policy,

is basically

hand, it is an integral
such closely

connected with domestic events.

a large extent a reaction
to unlerstand
settlement,
international

policy,

like any
On the one,

policy of the country and as
On the other hand, it is to

to the given international

the Soviet willingness
internal.

is to be provided

determined by two factors.

pa.rt of the overall

to negotiate

situation.
an Austrian

In order
peace

developments in the Soviet Union as well as the

situation

existing

to

at the time must be analyzed.

Here,

iv
The Current Digest .Q! the Soviet Press proved to be a very valuable

source

of informa tion.

The early Soviet policy toward Austria

indicates

that the Soviet

Union was hoping to include,

if not the whole of Austria,

Soviet zone in the satellite

empire. When developments in Austria

as Western opposition
negotiations

made the realization

on the treaty

conciliatory

a more favorable

principles.

was an important
An examination

factor

international

on the treaty.

After Stalin's

moves by the Malenkov government
climate.

Yet it was not until

military

The new Soviet policy of peaceful
in the shift

of the international

major international

of the Russian attitude
situation

problems had been settled.

situation

the

1953 and in 1955--were necessary

Khrushchev won power in the spring of 1955 that there was a clear
with Stalinist

as well

reached a stalemate.

to break the deadlock in the negotiations

created

the

of this aim very unlikely,

Tvo changes in Soviet leadership--in

death in 1953, several

at least

in Europe made an Austrian

coexistence
toward Austria.

at that · time reveals
The political
settlement

break

that

and

feasible

and

even advantageous from the Soviet point of view. Thus it is in the
combination of internal
situation

developments in the Soviet Union and the political

on the international

scene that the .reasons can be found for the

I

Russian withdrawal from Austria.

I

TABLEOF CONTENTS

CHAPTER

PAGE

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.
• • • •
ABSTRACT• • • • •
I.

• •

• • •

INDEPENDENT
AUSTRIA. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

• • •

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

. ... .. . . . . . ... .. . .

Events

Domestic Events ••••

• •

• •

• • • • • • • • • • • • •

NEGOTIATIONS
FORANAUSTRIAN
STATETREATYiPHASEI ••

Agenda

10

A

Great Disappointment

•

•

0

NEGOTIAT
I ONSFORANAUSTRIAN
STATETREATYiPHASEII

THEROLEOF THEAUSTRIAN
COMMUNIST
PARTY • • • •

. .. . . .•

SOVIETTECHNIQUF.S
IN AUSTRIA

SOVIETFOREIGN
POLICYAFTERSTALIN • • •

•

APPENDIX
A ••••••

•

0

•

29

• • • • •

35

• • • • • •

• •

44

•

•

52

•

•

•

•

•

•••••••••

•

0

•

• • •

• • • • •

0

•

• • • • •

. .• • •

• •

0

•

•

e

APPENDIX
B. Tables ••

0

APPENDIX
C. Figures.

e••••••••••••o•••o••••

•

•

•

•

•

•

\.
•

17

• •

0

• •

• • • • • • • • • • •

16

22

WHYTHESOVIETUNIW SIGNEDTHEAUSTRIAN
TREATY
IN 1955

.

•

• • •

•••••••••••••••

Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin

BIBLIOORAPHY
. • ••

•

... ... . ... ..... ... .

Plan

Soviet Aims in Austria

VIII.

4

.. .. . .... ... .. .. .. ..... .

IV. NEGOTIATIONS
FORANAUSTRIAN
STATETREATYaPHASEIII.

VII.

1

to Get the Austrian Question on the

The Cherriere

VI.

1

10

The MoscowConferences

v.

iii

• •

The Struggle

III.

ii

THEFIRST STEPSTCMARD
REBUILDING
A FREEAND

International

II.

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

•

•

•

•

G

I

53

..

54

..

75·

..

I

I

• • • •

96
102

104
107

I

THEFIRST STEPS TCMARD
REBUILDING
A FREE

ANDINDEPENDENT
AUSTRIA
The first

period,

which covers the time from the Foreign Ministers

Conference in Moscow in the fall
Austria

of 1943 to the new control

agreement for

on June 28, 1946, proved to be of major importance to the future

of Austria.
On

the international

stage important meetings and conferences

held which were to determine the course of future Regotiations
Austrian

state

treaty.

The domestic scene was characterized

were

for an

by the efforts

of Austrian statesmen to set up a new government in the middle of the
ruins and the chaos which marked the end of World War II.

I.

INTERNATIONAL
EVENTS

The major powers concerned themselves with the question
as early as 1943, when the Foreign Ministers
F.den), the United States

(Cordell Hull),

of Great Britain

of Austria
(Sir Anthony

and the Soviet Union (Vyacheslav

M. Molotov) met in Moscowto discuss

the post-war settlement

Europe. The Statement on Austria--as

part of the MoscowDeclaration

November 1, 1943-contained

of war-torn
of

the basic policy of the Four Powers towards

Austria. 1

1The French Committee of National Liberation published a statement
on November 16, 1943, with regard to the MoscowDeclaration. It contained
an affirmation of their belief in Austriah independence and expressed. their
conviction that the Austrian pa~riots would participate
in the liberation
of their country.

2

The Anschluss or 1938 2 was declared
expressed

their

intention

null and void and the Four Powers

to reestablish

Austria

as a free and independent

country.
The Governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the
United States of America are agreed that Austria, the first country to
f all a victim to Hitlerite
aggression,
shall be liberated
from German
d omin ation. They regard the annexation imposed on Austria by Germany
on March 15, 1938, as null and void. They consider themselves as in no
1,1a:ybound by any changes affected in Austria since that date. They
declare that they wish to see re-established
a free and independent
Austria and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves,
as well as those neighboring states which will be faced with similar
problems, to find that political
and economic security which is the
only basis for lasting peace. Austria is reminded, however, that she
has a responsibility
which she cannot evade, for participation
in the
war at the side of Hitlerite
Germany, and that in the final
settlement,
account will inevitably
be taken of her own contribution
to her liberation.3
It is extremely

important

here to note the distinction

a.IXl the case of Germany. The Allies

made between the case of Austria
not treat
victim.

Austria

as an enemy-country,

It was on the basis

was not settled

of this

by a peace treaty,

The next important

which vas

but rather

distinction

as Hitler's

first

that the Austrian

but by a state

step on the international

did

question

treaty.
scene was the Yalta

Conference in February 1945, a meeting of the heads of government of the
United States
W. Stalin)

of America (Franklin

D. Roosevelt),

the Soviet

Union (Joseph

and the United Kingdom (Winston Churchill).4

2on March 13, 1938j Hitler proclaimed
Germany. Austria became part of Germany.

the union of Austria

with

3William L. Stearman, .Iru! Soviet _Union and the . Occupation gI, Austria
(Wien: Verlag fuer Zeitarchieve,
1957), p. 12.
4Tbe French ProTisional

Government acceded to this

Declaration

later.

3
In the Declaration
terms their

on Liberated

Europe the Allied

approach to the post-war

settlement

Powers stated

in general

of the European problem.

The establishment
of order in Europe and the re-building
of national
economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the
liberated
peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism
and to create democratic institutions
of their own choice. This is a
principle
of the Atlantic Charter-the
right of all peoples to choose
the form of government under 'Which they will live--the
restoration
of
sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been
forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations •
• • • The three governments (United States, Soviet Union, United
Kingdom) will jointly assist the people in any European liberated
state •••
; (c) to fom interim governmental authorities
broadly
representative
of all democratic elements in the population and
pled ged to the earliest
possible establishment
through free elections
of governments responsive to the will of the peopleJ and (d) to
f ac i litate 'Where necessary the holding of such elections.5
The last
mentioning

important

in this

context

meeting of the three
is the Berlin

Big Powers which deserves

Conference of July and August

1945. Three parts of that agreement, which became know as the Potsdam
Agreement, are of special
Establishment

importance

here.

of the Council of Foreign Ministers

August 1, 1945. This Agreement created
was to handle a great

was to take over its
adopted at Berlin

German assets

was adopted at Berlin

the above mentioned Council,

deal of the negotiations

same Agreement abolished

importance.

The Agreement for the

on the Austrian

on

libich

treaty.

The

the European Advisory Oonnnission since the Council

f'unctions.

The Agreement on German Reparations,

on August 1, 1945, proved to be of much greater

It was this particular

Agreement with the clause

which caused so much difficulty

on external

in the negotiations

5ru.chard F. Fanno {ed.), The Yalta Conference (Problems in
American 'Civilization,
Boston• D.C. Heath and Co.P 1955), P• 34.

on the

4
Austrian

and which was used so many times by the Soviet Union to

treaty,

justify

seizures

dispute.

of property

in Eastern Austria

that were at least

open to

The important paragraphs read as follows:
IV Reparations

from Germany

1. Reparation claims of the USSRshall be met by removal from
the zone of Germany occupied by the USSR, and from
appropriate external German assets.

9. The governments of the United Kingdom and the United States
of America renounce their claims in respect of reparations
to shares of •••
German assets •••
in eastern Austria. 6
Part VII

It was agreed that reparations

should not be exacted from Austria. 7

The problems caused by the different

interpretations

clauses will be discussed

stage.

at a later

These three conferences
treaty

different

provided the guide lines

for the future

and all Four Powers again and again made reference

negotiations,

th es e conferences

of the above cited

in order to justify

and support their

policies

to

at the

stages of the negotiations.

II. OOMESTIC
EVENTS
The first
establishment
the Austrian

important

step on the part of Austria herself

of a provisional
Socialist

was the

government under Dr. Karl Renner, leader

Party (Sozialistische

.Partei

Oesterreichs,

6u.s.Element of the Allied Commission for Austria,
Graphic Survey (December 1953), p. XXIII.

SPOe for

Austria!

7Leland M. Goodrich and others . (eds.), Documents .Q!l American
Foreign Relations Vol. VIII 1945-46, (Bostons World Peace Foundation,

1947), p. 933.

of

5
short),

on April 27, 1945. It consisted

members of the Austrian
for short),
Partei

provisional

Party (Oesterreichische

seven members of the Austrian

Oesterreichs,

affiliations

People's

of ten members of the SPOe, nine

KPOe for short)

(experts).

Volkspartei,

OeVP

Comnrunist Party (Konnnunistisohe

and three members without party

At that time, only the Soviet Union recognized

government. The Western Powers regarded recognition

matter to be taken up by the Allied Council,

the

as a

vhich had yet to be

established.
After its

establishment,

the provisional

Pro kl amation ueber die Unabhaengigkeit
Ind ependence of Austria),

declaring

government adopted the

Oesterreicha

(Proclamation

among other things that the Anschlues

of 1938 was null and void, that Austria va.s again a democratic
to be governed by the constitution
government va.s to be established

republic

of 1920, and that a provisional
with the cooperation

par ti es i n order to achieve the aims of this
cont ain ed a statement

on the

of all

proclamation.

with regard to the obligations

anti-fascist

It also

under the Moscow

Decl aration , which read as follows:
In pflichtgemaesser
Erwaegung des Nachsatzes der Erklaerung der
Moskauer Konferenz (ueber die Verantwortung fuer die Teilnahme am
Krieg an der Seite Hitler Deutschlands) wird die einzusetzende Staatsregierung ohne Verzug die Massregeln ergreifen,
um jeden ihr moeglichen Beitrag zu seiner Befreiung zu leisten,
sieht sich jedoch
genoetigt, festzustellenj
dass dieser Beitrag angesichts der
Entkraeftung unseres Volkes und der Ent~eterung unseres Landes zu
ihrem Bedauern nur bescheiden sein kann.8

8 "With due consideration

to the concluding sentence o:f the Moscow
Declaration (on the responsibility
for the participation
in the war on the
side of Germany) the future government will without delay take all steps to
make every possible contribution
to its liberation.
The government,
however, deems it necessary in this connection to point out that this
contribution,
unfortunately,
can only be a small one in the light of the

6
On May 1, 1945, the provisional

Verfassungsueberleitungsgesetz
act the constitution

government passed the

(Constitutional

Transition

Law) by vhich

in force in 1929 as well as all Federal laws as of

March 5, 1933, became effective

also for the Second Republio. 9

At the beginning of July 1945, the European Advisory Commission1O
met in London to discuss
Austria
'Was

outlined

to consist

a control

agreement for Austria.

the control

machinery for Austria.

of the Allied

Council and Executive

appointed by the four governments concerned.
were as follows:

The Allied

Commission

Committee and staffs

The tasks of the Commission

(a) to secure the establishment

admini str at ive machinery;

The Statement on

of a central

(b) to prepare for a freely

elected

Austrian
Austrian

government; and (c) to provide for the temporary administration
Austria.

The four military

authority

in Austria

commissioners jointly

in respect

Ea.ch commander had full

authority

of matters

exercised

affecting

Austria

of

supreme
as a wole. 11

within his ow zone. All decisions

to be unanimous. The EAC also discussed

the occupation

had

zones in Austria,

plight of the Austrian people and the severe economic situation with which
our country has to cope." (Writer's translation).
Heinrich Siegler,
Neutralitaet,
Prosperitae~,
~1222
Oesterreichs ~ ~ Souveraenitaet,
(Wien: Verlag fuer Zeitarchieve,
1959), p. 9.
9Toe Austrian

constitution
could be described as a parliamentarypresidential
system. It is governed by a Federal Constitution which shows
a strong bias toward centralism.
10

At the Moscow Conference in 1943 it was decided to establish a
European Advisory Commission (consisting of representatives
of the four
Allies) to deal with European political
problems after the end of the war.
11 In 1945 the members of the Allied

CoI1D11issionfor Austria

werea

General Mark W. Clark (United States of America); Lieutentant General Sir
Ric hard Mccreery (United Kingdom)J Lieutenant General Emile-Marie
Beth ouart (France); Marshal Ivan S. Koneff (Soviet Union).

7

and the negotiations

resulted

Austria and Administration
Austrian

territory

in the Agreement on Zones of Occupation in

of the City of Vienna, signed July 9, 1945. The

was divided into four occupation

zones excluding

Vienna. The Russian zone included the Province of Niederoesterreich
(Lower Austria)

with the exception

Province of Oberoeste;reich

of Vienna and that part of the

(Upper Austria)

situated

north of the river

Danube. The American zone included that part of Oberoesterreich
the Danube and the Province of Salzburg.
Provinces Steiermark
(Eastern Tyrol).
and Vorarlberg
sectors

(Styria)

be

The French zone comprised the Provinces
(see Figure I). Vienna, like Berlin,

and Osttirol

Tirol (Tyrol)

was divided into four

(see Figure II).

session.

permitted

12

the extension

government to all parts
of British

Council for Austria held its

Here it was decided that the OeVP, SPOe and KPOewere to

to carry out their

It also discussed

stated

zone included the

and Kaernten (Carinthia),

On September 11, 1945, the Allied

first

The British

south of

opposition~

party activities

in all parts

of the authority

of the provisional

of Austria,
Finally

yet no decision

of Austria.

was reached because

on October 20, 1945, the Allied Council

in a memorandumto Dr. Karl Renner that the four Powers approved of

an extension
of Austria.

of the authority

They also agreed to free elections

12For the structure
13

of the provisional

government to the whole
in the same year. 13

of the Allied Commission see Figure III.

Dr. Gerald Stourzh in his book Grundzuege der oesterreichischen
Aussenpolitik advances the idea that these elections were only possible
because of the overconfidence of the Austrian Communists. They promised
the Russians something like 30 per cent of the votes, which was an utter
miscalculation.

8

On November 25, 1945, the first
national

level

(Nationalratswahlen),

free elections

were held on the

on the provincial

level

(Landtaga14

'Wa.hlen) and in the City of Vienna (Wahlen in den Gemeinderat ~).
Record numbers went to the polls,
Austria's

the largest

electoral

turnout

in

history.

After the elections
recognized

Council

the new government. The government, under the leadership

Federal Chancellor
Schaerf

all four Powers of the Allied

of

Ing. Leopold Figl (OeVP),, vas composed of Dr. Adolf

(SPOe), Vice-Chancellor,

and the Cabinet,

consisting

of eight

members of the OeVP, six members of the SPOe, one member of the KPOeand
two members without party affiliations.

On December 20, 1945, D:r. Karl

Renner was elected

by the Bundesyersammlung (Federal

Assembly), i.e.,
On

included
relations

President

Bundesrat (Upper House) am Nationalrat

June 28, 1946, Austria

certain

restrictions

got a new control

with regard to the resumption of diplomatic

the extension

government over the entire
regarding

of the authority

territory

)

after

run international

of Austria,

and a very significant

the exception

agreements--were

sul:mission to the Allied Council, unless

Council approval

of the Austrian

the law making powers of the Austrian

laws enacted by the government-with
provisions

(Lower House). 15

agreement, which

with non-members of the United Nations (Allied

vas necessary),

provision

of Austria

government. All

of constitutional

to enter into force 31 days
"unanimously" disapproved

14see Table I for the returns of the national elections. •
15Parliament~
election of the president goes back to 1931 when
Austria eliminated direct popular elections because of the existing state
of political
tension.

9
by

the Allied Council. A comparison with the old control

how the powers of the Austrian

agreement shows

government were extended. Previously

all

laws had to be "unanimously" approved by the Council. Nowit was no longer
16
possible for one single Power to block important domestic legialation.
After the extension

of the government's authority

into force of the new control

agreement, no major changes took place

within the Austrian

government. With the exception
17
to overthrow the government,
no serious

of two Communist

attempts

threats

the stability

of the Austrian

in dependence centered

\\

government. The struggle

thereafter

on the international

It was a period of prolonged discussions
vari ous levels,
Russ ians,

after

dor:1esti c repercussions.
thesis,

due reference

for Austria's
level.

attitudes

on
of the

it became obvious that it was only

move in the political

these events (such as the question

were posed to

and negotiations

of hope awakened by more conciliatory

and of frustrations

another strategic

\

and the coming

chess game. Naturally,

of German assets),

Where i t is necessary
will be made to national

however, t he emphasis will be on international

some of

had significant

for the purpose of this
events;

in general,

events in the following

chapters.

16The following enumeration should give some indicat i on of the
activ i ti es of the Allied Commission in Austria. It had to deal with:
internat i--oruµ agreements between Austria and other countries; transport
of corpses in the Austro-Swiss frontier traffic;
denazification;
replacement
of German legislation
by Austrian laws; demilitarization;
censorship; or
installation
of a telephone which had to be connected ta a switchboard
which happened to be in a different
zone.
17

For further

details

,

see Chapter V, PP• 41-44.

II
NEGOTIATIONS
FORAN AUSTRIAN
STATETREATY:

HIASEI
The first
of the political
war Austrian
question

period of the negotiations
"tug-of-var"

illustration

between East and West. After the end of the

statesmen naturally

were interested

and in restoring

as soon as possible

independence.

is an excellent

in settling
Austria's

the Austrian

sovereignty

Yet it took almost two years before the Austrian

question

vas even put on the agenda of the Council of Foreign Ministers.
United States
Austria,

was making every possible

the Russians were outright

too early and that other questions,
treaties

for the Balkan states,

effort

and

'While the

to open negotiations

opposed to this,

arguing that it was

such as the Italian

had to be settled

on

treaty

first.

or the

Even among the

Western Powers there was no unanimity as to how and when the Austrian
question

should be, handled.
L

THESTRUGGLE
TO GET THEAUSTRIAN
QUESTION
ON THEAGENDA

At the beginning of May 1946, United States
James Byrnes submitted a draft
question

for the settlement

to the Council of Foreign Ministers

provisiomof

the draft

were: (a) Austria

(b) Austria had to protect
religion,

treaty

etc.;

democratic

in Paris.

of State

of the Austrian
The main

should regain her independence;

liberties

(c) the Big Four would recognize

defend the independence of Austria;

Secretary

such as freedom of speech,
and comn1it themselves to

(d) the German assets

question

be handled in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement; (e) freedom of

would

11
commerce would be guaranteed
to those necessary
Czechoslovakia,

on the Danube; (f) armaments would be limited

for internal

Switzerland,

order;

and (g) the frontiers

Liechtenstein,

remain as of January 1, 1938. The frontier
but some guarantees

for civil

liberties

Hungary and Germany would
with Italy

would remain too,

would be provided.

Yet the Soviet Union was not willing

to discuss

question.

No progress

Secretary

Byrnes proposed to call a 21-nation

the Austrian

was to be expected on that point.

the Austrian

For this

peace conference

around the middle of July with the hope of finding
forum there and of getting

with

question

reason
in Paris

a more responsive
on the agenda. This

I

pro posal "Wassupported by Bevin (United Kingdom) and Bidault

(France),

but was opposed by Molotov.
Finally

the futile

meeting was recessed

agreement on the major issues.

Byrnes in his report

Conference said among other thingss

"• ••

t hat we press forward with the Austrian
contemplated

until

June 15, without arcyon the Paris

it is particularly

treaty.

important

The MoscowDeclaration

a sa tellite

that Austria should be regarded more as a liberated than as
country. 1 The making of peace with Austria is essential to the

restoration

of anything like conditions

The Council resumed its
reaching any further

session

of peace in Europe. 112
on June 15j 1946, without

agreement on the Austrian

treaty.

An excerpt

of the

10n more than one occasion it was ma.de clear by the Western Powers
that Austria was not regarded as an enenzy-country. · On October 28, 1946,
President Truman issued a statement to the effect that Austria was a
"liberated"
country~ The United Kingdom adopted the same viev.
2

New York Times, March 21, 1946, p. 4.

12
report

by the Secretary

illustration

of State

of the positions

(Byrnes) on this meeting gives a good

of the four Powers.

Finally, we crune to a discussion of the Austrian problem. On
June 1, I had circulated a proposed draft treaty recognizing the
independence of Austria and providing for the withdrawal of the
occupying troops. The British also had submitted a draft for
consideration.
I asked that the Deputies be directed to prepare
the treaty.
The Soviets submitted a counterproposal
calling first for further
action to insure the de-Nazification
of Austria and the removal of a
large number of displaced persons from Austria whomthey regarded as
unfriendly to them.
The British and French were willing to join us in submitting to
the Deputies the consideration
of the treaty and in requesting the
Control Council to investigate
and report on the progress of
de-Nazification
and the problem of the displaced persons. But the
Soviets were unwilling to agree to the Deputies' talcing up the
Austrian treaty until more tangible action was talcen on these other
two problems.3
Thi s meeting, however, was significant
rejec ted Austria's

insofar

as the Council

claims to part of Southern Tyrol on the grounds that

this would constitute

a major border rectification.

Although Austria was not on the agenda of the 21-nation
conference

in Paris,4

that

since it helped to settle

conference was of considerable

asking for self-

of Southern Tyrol. The conference voted for a hearing

the problem of Southern Tyrol. After long bilateral
the Austrian

importance

the problem of Southern Tyrol. The Austrian

government sent a note to the Paris peace conference
determination

peace

Foreign Minister,

negotiations

Dr. Karl Gruber, am the Italian

on

between

Prime

JLeland M. Goodrich and others (eds.), Documents .Q!! American
Foreign Relations Vol. VIII 1945-46, (Boston: World Peace Foundation,
1947), p. 284.
4Austrian delegates
they had no voice.

were .seated at the Paris peace conference,

but

1.3
Minister,

Alcide de Gasperi,

a compromise was achieved,

which was to be

submitted to the Paris peace conference and the Council of Foreign
Ministers. 5 The Gruber-de Gasperi Agreement was signed on September 5,

1946, and was incorporated

in the Appendix of the Italian

on the basis of a decision

of the Council of Foreign Ministers

their

Peace Treaty
during

meeting in New York in November and December 1946.
When the next meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers6

place in New York (November-December 1946), Austria
the agenda. The Soviet Union was still
state

treaty.

two proposals

for a settlement

by the United States

important

of all,

Austria

once more was not on

to discuss

Yet this meeting was of great significance

subnitted

their

unwilling

the Austrian

to Austria.

of the German and Austrian
and the Soviet

took

questions

First,
were

Union. Second, and most

the Big Four agreed to put Austria

on the agenda of

next meeting, which was to be held in Moscow in March 1947. True,
was at the bottom of the list,

agenda. In addition~
study the Austrian

the Council agreed to appoint
and German treaties

January 14, 1947. This was the first
of the Austrian
On

but at least

question;

Austria

she was on the
special

deputies

to

at a meeting scheduled for
positive

finally

step toward a settlement

was a conference

January 15, 1947, the Foreign Ministers

issue.

Deputies began their

5
The compromise was as follows: The entire area of Southern Tyrol
would remain within the Italian territorial
sovereignty, but the
Austrian population in this area was to get regional autonomy and
minority privileges.
6

Representatives
on the Council were: Ernest Bevin (United
Kingdom); James Byrnes (United States); V. M. Molotov (Soviet Union);
and Maurice Couve de Murville (France).

►
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talks

in London. Their task was to draw up two treaties,

and one for Austria.

From the very beginning tension

West and the Soviet Union. The latter
treaty

and then discuss

first

discuss

them simultaneously.

one for Germany

arose between the

wanted to complete the German

the Austrian

one, while the West wanted to

It was the Western approach which finally

prevailed.
The Austrian

government was invited

the treaty,

and Federal Chancellor

conference.

Foreign Minister

Austrian

Austria's

Austria's

status

Karl Gruber outlined

Austria

The treaty

should:

stage the
(a) re-

of German assets

borders.

The United States
border,

financially

obvious that the delegates

question

were faced with major
on1 (1) the

(2) the guarantee

of Austria's

was particularly

the actual

and politically).

centered

The disagreement

in Austria;?

and prompt

and (c) completely and clearly

from Germany (economically,

as to the treaty.

of the eastern

at a later

as a member of the community of nations

Soon it bee~
difficulties

point of view on

borders as of January 1, 1938; (b) recognize

withdrawal of the occupation forces;
separate

its

Leopold Figl appeared before the

aims with regard to the treaty.

establish

to state

frontiers

interested

in the protection

of Austria

and the wording of

7This question will be dealt with rather extensively in Chapters
V and VI of this thesis. For our purposes here it suffices to point out
that the disagreement was caused by different definitions
of German
assets by the Western Powers on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the
other. The clause of the Potsdam Agreement which deals with this
question is rather vague (see Chapter I, p. 4). While the Western Powers
used the definition
given by the United Nations in January 194.3, known as
the London Declaration, the Russians used their own definition
which was
much more advantageous for their particular
aimse
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the preamble. 8
Yet as compared to the draft
progress

for the German treaty,

vas achieved in the negotiations

Several

clauses

democratic

were approved,

ballot

ma.king it mandatory for Austria
providing

for a restoration

for the Austrian

among others

system vith secret

a certain

a clause providing

and universal

to protect

treaty.

suffrage;

human rights;

of documents from Austria

for a
a clause

and a clause

to Germany and

vice versa.
Toward the middle of February another
de adl ock the negotiations.
her clai ms were supported

Yugoslavia claimed parts

and urged a restoration

J anuary 1, 1938. While the conference
progress

9 and

of Carinthia,

by the Soviet Union. The Western Powers

r ej ect ed the Yugoslav claim,

question,

to

problem threatened

had reached a stalemate

was ma.de in some other areas.

work Ylith some of the military

clauses,

of the borders

dealing

The conference

of

on this
finished

vith the withdrawal

of

8

In the preamble to the treaty the Russians wanted to pin as much
war guilt on Austria as possible, while the United Kingdom and the
Uni ted States wanted to make Austria lo~k like the unhappy victim . No
agr eement was reached on th i s point.

i

f

9 rn 1910, 304,287 Germans and 82,212 Slovenes lived in Cari nthia
(figures taken from the Encyclopaedia Britannica). After the World War I
the Yugoslav claimed the south eastern part of Carinthia with the capital
Klagenfurt. Under the Treaty of St. Germain an area of 128 sqmi . was
given to Yugoslavia. The other disputed area, however, was subjected to a
plebiscite
under the supervision of the Inter-Allied
Plebiscite
Connnission. The territory
was divided into two zones. Zone A was rural
vith a population of about 78,000 . Zone B included the City of Klagenfurt
with a German majority . The results in Zone A showed a heavy majority in
favor of staying with Austria. On the basis 9f these results,
the
plebiscite
in the other Zone was cancelled.
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the occupation forces,

the Austrian

When the London conference
prospects

for an Austrian

worked out a rough draft
paragraphs

(five

treaty

ended on February 25, 1947, the
were rather

of the treaty

of 'Which were fully

27 were either

good. The conference

had

with a preamble of nine
approved),

13 of these clauses were never discussed
clauses discussed,

etc. 10

air force,

fully

and 53 potential

clauses.

Of the 40

by the Deputies.

agreed to or the differences

were only of a minor nature.
The major areas of disagreement
the question
dispute

of German assets,

at the end of the conference were

the Yugoslav territorial

and the

between East and West as to 'Whether the preamble should state

that Austria was a liberated
however, were confident
Moscow could settle
II.
On

country or not. The Western Powers,

that the Council of Foreign Ministers

me~ting in

the remaining problems.

'IHE MOSCOW
CONFERENCE:A GREATDISAPPOINTMENT

March 10, the meeting of the Counc11 of Foreign Ministers

opened in Moscow. The atmosphere was friendly,
several

claims,

clauses.

German assets

and progress

was made on

However, it soon became obvious that the question

in Austria

would pose considerable

wanted the Western Powers to recognize

10 The Deputies agreed that

problems.

the Soviet seizures

of

The Russians
in the ·

90 days after the signing of the State
Trea ty al l occupying forces were to be withdrawn. As far as the air
f orc e was concerned, it was agreed that Austria was to have 90 planes,
not more than 70 could be or combat type, and none of these were
supposed to be bombers. The maximumpersonnel of the air force was to
be 5,000 men.
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zone of Austria. 11 The West, which adhered to a different

eastern
definition

of German assets,

conference

reached a dead end on this

for agreement.

of the clause

to attend

view. The negotiations
on German assets

It was on these three
stalemate.

rejected
issues

agreement on these major points;

Commission to study further

III.

their

rejected

by Foreign

claims,

held its

by the

by the Western Powers and Austria.

that

the conference

ended on April
in fact,

finally

reached

25, 1947, with no

the two Blocs were further
of the conference.

the conference

appointed

In order

a Four Power

the issue.

'
'!HECHERRIERE
PLAN

On May 12, 1947, the Four Power Connnission, established

Moscow Conference,

Yugoslavia

which were supported

than at the beginning

to cont inue the discussions,

Austrian

claims which were

to the territorial
Austria

hope

well with the exception

these were firmly

The conference

on these issues

and to present

and the territorial

claims against

Soviet Union, and were firmly

apart

and the

But there was still

went fairly

Karl Gruber. In addition

also made reparation

complete

issue.

the conference,

brought up again by Yugoslavia;
Minister

to do this,

Toward the end of March the Council invited

representatives
government's

was unwilling

first

session

at the

in Vienna. The negotiations

11At the beginning of July 1946, the Russians seized a number of
enterprises
and factories
in the eastern zone of Austria, claiming that
these enterprises
fell under the heading of German assets.
The Western
Powers, relying on the Declaration on Forced Transfer of Property in
Enemy Controlled

claims,
,Jc

~

Country

and refused

(London Declaration)

to recognize

the legality

rejected

the Russian

of the Soviet

seizures.
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proceeded very slowly.

The Commission held 85 sessions

between May 12,

and October 11, 1947. On October 8, the French delegate
Cherri~re

submitted

a plan for the settlement

question.

Tb.is plan became known as the Cherriere

of the German assets
Plan. 12 However, there

was no agreement on the Plan, and it was submitted
Foreign Ministers

at their

General Paul

to the Council of

next meeting in London (November 25-

December 15). 13 Yet here too, no agreement was achieved on this
Russians were prepared to accept it in principle,
to make certain
On

Cherriere

counterproposals

but reserved

with regard to individual

January 24, 1948, the Russians made their
Plan.

They were willing

to accept it,

Plan.

The

the right

items.

reply to the

but they demanded two-

thirds

of the current

oil production;

two-thirds

areas;

oil refineries

with a capacity

of 450,000 tons per year for fifty

years;

all

possessions

of the oil exploration

of the Donaudampfschiffahrtsgesellschaft

Ht¢gary, Rumania and Bulgaria and 25 per cent of its
and a sum of $200 million

assets

in
in Austria;

payable in two years. 14

12According to this Plan, the German assets demarrled by the USSR
should be divided into two categoriesz
(a) all demands regarding the
Austrian oil production and the Donaudampfschiffahrtsgesellschaft
(Danube Steam Ship Company); (b) all other demands. Concessions regarding
Austri an oi l: the Soviet Union was to get 50 per cent of the current oil
pro:iuc tio n; one-third of the oil exploration areas around Zistersdorf
(main Aust rian oil fields);
and refineries
with an annual capacity between
250,000 and 300,000 tons. As for the DDSGclaims, the USSR"W8.S to get all
its ass ets in Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania. All other claims should be
met by a payment of $100 million.
13Ernest Bevin (United Kingdom); V. M. Molotov (Soviet Union);
Georges Bidault (France); George Marshall (United States).
taet,

1'4iieinrich Siegl~r, Oesterreichs Weg ~ Souveraeirltaet,
Prosperitaet,
~-12-22 (Wiens Verlag fuer Zeitarchieve,

Neutrali1959), p. 25.

f

._
i'

•
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Despite these demands and the difficulties
Austria were still

optimistic

they posed, the West and

and were hoping to arrive

The Foreign Ministers

Deputies held their

at a compromise.

next meeting from

February 13 to March 31, 1948, in London. 15 They dealt
problems: the Cherriere
concessions

Plan and the Yugoslav claims.

payable in six years instead

some other minor changes),

from the meeting to describe

Mr. Koktomov: The position

territory

and the

the general Russian attitude.

still

is quite

the Yugoslav claims.

Do the compromise proposals

Soviet Delegation

futile,

of the Soviet Delegation

in that it supports

Mr. Marjoribanks:

discussion

Russia's

Dr. Karl Gruber, Austrian Foreign Minister,

meeting ended in a deadlock.

clear

of two, as well as

claims to Carinthia.

support of the Yugoslav claims made further

used excerpts

to reduce the

no agreement was reached on the Plan.

Yugoslavia again made her territorial

involve the cession

envisaged by the
of Austrian

to Yugoslavia?

Koktomovi Yes.

Mr. Reber:

Nowfurther

bargain over Austria's
This statement

15

Despite some

on part of the Soviet Union (she was willing

payment to $150 million

Va-.

with two

was later

discussion
frontiers.

seems to be futile.

I will not

16

on denied by the Russians.

In the meantime,

united Kingdom: James Marjoribanks (Austrian expert in the
British Foreign Office); United States: Sa.mu.elReber · (career diplomat);
France: General Paul Cherriere; Soviet Unionz Commercial Counsellor
Nicolai Koktomov.
16
Karl Gruber, Between Liberation m:!9.Liberty _(New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, Inc., 1955), PP• 154-155.
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relations

between Yugoslavia and Russia were deteriorating.

Ministers

Deputies met again from February 8 to

violent

10, 1949. By then a

press war was going on between Belgrad and Moscow. The issues

were still

the sames the German assets

agreement was arrived

at on either

It was not until
May

May

The Foreign

No

point.

the Foreign Minsters Conference in Paris

24 to June 20, 1949, 17 that

some progress

this meeting the Soviet delegation
Yugoslav claims.

and the Yugoslav claims.

was finally

regarded the Yugoslav claims as justified,

that

the Soviet Union still

but that it

wil li ng t o support them. The Soviet Union was primarily
question

At

achieved.

suddenly cea~ed to support the

Andrej Vishinsky stated

s et tli ng the German assets

from

'WB.S

no longer

interested

in

and was not that much concerned

about the Yugoslav claims.

In general this conference gave new hopes to the Western Powers
and Austria

for an early settlement

of the problem. The representatives

reached agreement on the main principles
communique of June 21, 1949, adequately
been ma.de. The Austrian

frontiers

of an Austrian
described

was not obliged to pay reparations;

German assets

was settled
treaty

The

the progress

wich

had

were the same as those of January 1,

1938; Austria

draw up a draft

treaty.

in principle.

and the question

of

The Deputies were instructed

to

on the basis of these agreed principles.

The Deputies met from July 4 to September 1, 1949, in London and

1 7nean Acheson (United States); Ernest Bevin (United Kingdom);
Robert Schuman (France); Andrej Vishinsky (Soviet Union).
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on September 22 and 23, in New York, without reaching
Deputies resumed discussions
yet no further

progress

end. At the request

issue.
still

was ma.de, and another futile

on May

place. 19 At this
to discuss

came to an

4, 1950. Here the Russians brought up a new

troops in Trieste.

before any further

question

session

Georgij Zarubin, a new

Zarubin accused the West of violating
maintaining

The

from October 10, 1949, to April 26, 1950,

of the Soviet delegate

meeting was called

agreement.18

talks

the Italian

Peace Treaty by

He demanded a settlement

on an Austrian

treaty

of this

could take

time it was obvious that the Russians were not willing

seriously

the Austrian

treaty.

No constructive

talks

took

place for about two years.

18There were basically five major areas yet to be settledz
(a) the relief to displaced persons; (b) the Soviet Union wanted to
prevent Austria from employing foreign military advisors and experts.
The West regarded this an unnecessary restriction;
(c) the ~uestion of
the compensation for the transfer of United Nations property in Austria.
The Western Powers wanted some compensation for transfers
of property
after the Anschluss in those cases where no compensation had been offered.
The Soviet Union was against this since it seemed to benefit primarily the
Western Powers; (d) disputes over the Austrian obligations with regard to
debts incurred during the war; (e) post-war debts. ,The Soviet Union
wanted Austria to pay for all Allied supplies, services, etc., while the
United States 'Waswilling to waive these claims.
William L. Stearman,
The Soviet Union and the Occupation .QI..Austria (Wien: Verlag fuer
Zeitarchieve,
1957), P• 142.
19Siegler,

\

£12• cit.,

pp. 28-29.

III
NEGOTIATIONS
FORAN AUSTRIANSTATETREATYz
PHASEII
As already
standstill
Austrian
all

indicated,

the next period was one of almost complete

in the negotiations
state

further

treaty.

It was primarily

negotiations.

of Trieste,

Yet despite

On

requirements,

complied vi.th

and finally

refused

to

to the scheduled meetings.
all

these obstacles,

Western Powers arrl Austria
a settlement

such as the question

of not having sufficiently

and demilitarization

send representatives

the Soviet Union which frustrated

It brought up new issues

accused Austria

denazification

between the four Powers with regard to an

of the Austrian

to continue

were being made by the

the negotiations

and to arrive

at

question.

January 19, 1952, an invitation

Union to resume negotiations.

efforts

was extended to the Soviet

The Soviet answer to the Secretary-General

of the Conference of Foreign Ministers

Deputies was as follows:

Dear Mr. Dowing,
In connection with your letter of 19 January, the Soviet
delegation considers it necessary to state that, as formerly, it
considers that the question of the Austrian Treaty cannot be
examined independently of the fulfillment
by the Austrian
Government of the decision of the Four Powers on the
demilitarization
and denazification
of Austria and the question
. of the fulfillment
by the Governments of Great Britain, the United
States of America and France of their obligations
according to the
peace treaty with Italy in that part which concerns the Free
Territory of Trieste. Your answer to the letter
of the Soviet
which was received on the 19 January, requires study.
delegation,

23
In view of this, the Soviet representative
will not be able to
attend the meeting of the Deputies on the 21 January.
Yours sincerely,
V. Jerofejev 1
This clearly
continuing

indicated
constructive

that the Russians were not interested
talks

at that point.

In an attempt to get the discussions
Po-wers, with the consent of the Austrian
"abbreviated

53 articles

treaty"

started

again the Western

government, submitted an

comprising only eight articles,

of the original

were to end the occupation

in

draft.

as compared to the

The main provisions

and to reestablish

of this

Austria's

treaty

independence.

The West also wanted a clause renouncing claims to German assets
Austria,

a demand 'Which was utterly
From here on the contacts

the Soviet Union were maintained
channels.

The Austrian

intensive

exchange of notes.

On August

state

unacceptable

in

to the Soviet Union.

between the Western Powers, Austria
through the conventional

treaty

became the subject

and

diplomatic

of a rather

14, 1952, the Russians demanded in a note to the

Western Powers the withdrawal of the "abbreviated

treaty."

The Western

Powers proposed in reply to the Soviet Union (September 5, 1952)
another meeting of the Foreign Ministers
were not 'Willing to participate

Deputies;

the Russians,

however,

in the meeting.

In the face of these obstacles

Austria

turned to the United

1
Karl Gruber, Between Liberation .and Liberty
A. Praeger, Inc., 1955), pp. 202-203.

(Nev Yor:\(1Frederick
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Nations.

The Soviet Union was opposed to any discussion

question

by the United Nations,

world received

but despite

this

of the Austrian

every government in the

a memorandumon July 31, 1952, describing

the stage of the negotiations
The Austrian

of the Austrian

Foreign Minister,

the problems and

treaty.

Karl Gruber, visited

Brazil

in

July 1952, and .got its

support for the Austrian

cause. Brazil was willing

to take the initiative

on the Austrian

in the United Nations. 2

Brazil

question

sent a note to the Secretary-General

(September 18, 1952) requesting

of the United Nations

that Austria

General Assembly. The note was co-sponsored

be put on the agenda of the
by Holland,

Lebanon and

Mexico.3
Thus the agenda included
the Powers, Signator~es
an Early Fulfillment
filed
Austria

to present

its

"Question of an Appeal to

to the Moscov Declaration

of their

an unsuccessful

an item called

protest.

of 1 November 1943, for

Pledges towards Austria.
Mexico presented

11

The Soviet Union

a motion to invite

case to the world forum, and Foreign Minister

Karl Gruber addressed the General Assembly on behalf of Austria.
appeal was approved by a great majority

giving Austria

The

the support of

the Latin American, African and Asian countries.4
Although the Russians did not immediately return

to the

2Austria needed somebody to present her case to the United Nations,
since she was not a member of this organization at that time.
3 Gruber, m2• cit.,

PP• 276-297.

448 countries voted in favor of the appeal. Not a single country
was opposed. Afghanistan and Pakistan abstained. The countries of the
Soviet Bloc did not participate
in the voting.
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conferen ce table,

the atmosphere improved somewhat after

at t he United Nations.
Malik,

Austrian Foreign Minister

the interlude

Karl Gruber met Jacob

Soviet Ambassador to London, for an exchange of opinions.

On January 12, 1953, the three Western Powers sul:mitted a note to
the USSRproposing new negotiations

on Austria.

The Soviet Union answered

with a note on January 27, denouncing the United Nations appeal yet
indicating

their

"abbreviated

willingness

treaty"

to participate

treaty"

if the

was withdrawn. On February 9, the Foreign Ministers

Deputies met, yet no progress
"abbreviated

in discussions

was made. The West insisted

while the Soviet Union bluntly

on the
to discuss

it.

The Western Powers suggested another meeting. The Soviet Union refused

to

come, because it considered

refused

such a meeting a waste of time.

On June 25, 1953, Dr. Karl Gruber asked the Indian Prime Minister
Jawa.harlal Nehru for his good offices
independence.
discuss

Krishna Menon, wo visited

the Austrian

indicating

Moscow somewhat later,

her willingness

a note to the Soviet Union on June
to enter into diplomatic

state

treaty.

its willingness

negotiations

treaty"

if the "abbreviated

JO, 1953,

negotiations

In answer to Austria and the three

Western Powers, Russia indicated

to enter diplomatic

was withdrawn.

5Heinrich Siegler, Oesterreichs Weg ~ .Souveraenitaet,
12ki~l.25.2.(Wien: Verlag fuer Zeitarchieve,
Prosperitaet,

PP• 32-JJ.

did

with Molotov; however, no immediate change
5
occurred.

transmitted

concerning the Austrian

taet,

of Austria's

question

of the Soviet attitude
Austria

for the restoration

Neutrali1959),

26
On August 16, 1953, the Western Powers transmitted

Soviet Union indicating

their

August 19, 1953, Austria

a note to the

withdrawal of the "abbreviated

treaty."

On

approved the withdrawal of the "abbreviated

treaty."
While there was little

progress

on the international

scene, the

Russians suddenly showed a much more conciliatory

attitude

They exchanged ambassadors,

High Connnissioner with

the military

High Commissioner, and on July JO, they announced their

a civilian
decision

replaced

to renounce the occupation

The Federal

Chancellor

Julius

saying that these steps clearly
phase in relations

costs Austria

had to pay so far. 6

Raab gave expression
indicated

with the Eastern

to the new hope by

that Austria

discussions

on the international

Union indicated

three identical
discuss

level.

On August 4, 1953, the Soviet

On

in the light

of a solution

of the

November 25, 1953, the Western Powers transmitted

notes to the USSRexpressing

any proposal for a solution

their

of the Austrian

was not connected with any other question.

willingness
question

to
provided it

This exchange of notes finally

led to a new important meeting between the Big Four--the
ference

into the

in a note to the Western Powers that the Austrian

could be solved much easier

German question.

had entered a new

Bloc.

Yet at the same time a new issue was introduced

question

toward Austria.

Berlin Con-

from January 25 to February 18, 1954. 7 The differences

as to the

6The United States

of America renounced the occupation costs as
early as June 1947. On August 18, 1953, the British decided to
renounce the occupation costs as of January 1, 1954. A similar decision
was announced by the French on September 19, 1953.
7John Foster Dulles (United States of America), Georges Bidault
(France); Anthony F.den (United Kingdom); V. M. Molotov (Soviet Union).
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agenda were finally

settled,

dis cuss ion of the Austrian

and the Conference could begin. During the
treaty,

the Austrian Foreign Minister

Leopol d Fig l 8 and State Secretary

Bruno-Kreisky were allowed to

Ing.

partici pat e.
On February

Power s t o settle

12, 1954, Foreign Minister

the Austrian

V. M. Molotov presented

question

as soon as possible.

the Russian proposal

Deputies should draw up a final

draft

Figl appealed to the four

for the state

of the treaty

from entering

to have any foreign
ws willing

military

alliance,

of occupation

(1) Austria

had

(2) the Soviet Union

payment in kind instead

of cash;

troops could take place only after

with Germany; (4) the question

of a treaty

The

and was not allowed

bases on her territory;

to accept the $150 million

(3) withdrawal

conclusion

into any military

treaty.

within three months.

Several new points were to be taken into consideration&
to refrain

The same day

of Trieste

the
had to

be solved. 9
Foreign Minister

Figl stated

his disappointment

Russian proposal.

A treaty

would be a farce.

The Western Powers, too, voiced their

to the proposal,

in particular

German peace treaty
voluntarily

without withdrawal

to linking

and to neutralizing

to choose neutrality,

of the occupation

the Austrian
Austria.

Siegler,

.QJ2•

cit.,

-

p. 36.

strong opposition
problem with the

If Austria were

Yet despite

On November 26, 1953, Dr. Karl Gruber resigned
Leopold Figl became the new Austrian Foreign Minister.

9·

troops

the West would be glad to recognize

but it could not be forced upon a country.

8

with regard to the

all the con-

his post,

Ing.

it,
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cessions

that

the Western Powers were willing

were to drop the demand for neutralization
troops,

the Soviet Union was not willing
On

Austria's
the clause

to make if the Soviet Union

and to withdraw its

to give in on these points.

February 16, 1954, the Austrian

Foreign Minister

willingness

of a neut~al

to adopt the status

on the occupation

was delighted

over Austria's

troops was utterly
attitude

will in g to compromise on the issue

occupation

Figl declared

country,

unacceptable.

toward neutrality,
of the occupation

however,
Molotov .

yet was not

troops. 10

When the Conference ended on February 18, 1954, the withdrawal
troops was the only unresolved
refusal

question.

to compromise on that issue,

approval

of the five disputed

be another

Thus a conference

which had

and in the Western countries

proved to

disappointment.

Yet the struggle
passed a resolution,
surrender

Yet in view of the Russian

the Western Powers withdrew their

articles.

aroused so many hopes in Austria

of

Austria's

expressing
sovereignty

Austria's

determination

arrl to insist

resume negotiations,

but they were fruitless.

had reached a deadlock.

10 Ib id. , p. 37.

Parliament

not to

upon the fulfillment

of November 1, 1943. Again attempts

Moscow Declaration

the negotiations

went on. In May 1954, the Austrian

of the

were made to

It seemed once more that

IT

NEGOTIATIONS
FORANAUSTRIANSTATETREATYz
PHASEIII
The Berlin Conference marked the end of another
attempt

to draw up

vanished

a state

treaty

for an early fulfillment

Declaration

for Austria.

rest ·of 1954. Both sides were unwilling

Supreme Soviet
willingness
Berlin

Again all

hope had

of the promise of the Moscow

of November 1, 1943. No important

Then came the historic

unsuccessful

meeting took place for the

to compromise.

speech of V. M. Molotov at a session

on February 8, 1955. The Soviets,

to compromise on the issues

all

of the

of a sudden, showed

which led to the deadlock

of the

Conference in 1954.

The Soviet Union attaches great significance
to the settlement of
the Austrian question, the question of a full restoration
of the
independence of a democratic Austria. At the same time one cannot
fail to take into consideration
those dangers which the plans of
militarization
of Western Germany, such as the Paris agreements,
bring for Austria.
The settlement of the Austrian question cannot be examined
independently of the German question, especially
in view of the
existing plans of remilitarization
of Western Germany, which
increases the threat of absorbtion,
the Anschluss of Austria.
The withdrawal of the armed forces of the four powers from
Austria can be achieved without awaiting the conclusion of the peace
treaty with Germany.
Austria must take upon herself not to enter any kind of coaiition
or military alliance directed against any power which took part with
its armed forces in the war against Hitlerite
Germany and in the
liberation
of Austria and not to allow also the creation on her
territory
of foreign military bases.
In the interest
of speedy settlement of the Austrian question an
immediate convening of the four power conferenc~ is necessary at which
the German questi~n on the conclusion of the state treaty with Austria
will be examined.

1New York Times, February 9, 1955, P• 6.

JO
This showed that the Russians were 'Willing to compromise on the
most important

point,

making the withdrawal of troops from Austria

longer dependent on a German peace treaty
reversal

of their

position

a.n:i representing

at the Berlin Oonference.

time there was real hope for the conclusion
The Austrian

government instructed

Moscow, Norbert Bischoff,
Austrian
first

to establish

Ambassador, in fact,

for the withdrawal

Ambassador to

with the Soviets.

was no longer regarded

clarification

the Soviet stand
as a prerequisite

The second meeting (March 2,

of the issues.

Ambassador assured Molotov that Austria

herself

The Austrian

wants to prevent a

second Anschluss by any means. Molotov wanted an official
Austria

answer from

with regard to his speech on February 8. This official

was transmitted

The

had three meetings with Molotov. At the

of troops from Austria.

1955) served as a further

treaty.

the Austrian

meeting on February 25, 1955, Molotov affirmed

that the German peace treaty

a complete

It seemed that this

of a state

contacts

no

to Molotov at the third

statement

meeting with the Austrian

Ambassador, March 14, 1955.
This official
{a) Austria

statement,

welcomed the guarantee

the protection

against

give a declaration
into any military
her territory;

alliances

that

(b) Austria

she would refrain

was willing

that:

~ew conference

of the Austrian

Oesterreichs

bases on

question

and with the participation

Weg zur Souveraenitaet,
fuer Zeitarchieve,

m-1222.{Wien: Verlag

to

from entering

and would not permit any foreign

and (c) that a solution

2Heinrich Siegler,
Prosperita~t,

declared

of her independence and freedom and

a second Ansohluss;

to the effect

worked out only at~

taet,

the Dreipunkteerklaerung,

could be
of Austria. 2

Neutrali1959). P• 39.
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On March 24, 1955, Molotov received

the Austrian

Moscow and gave him the answer to the Austrian
Soviet Union recognized
troops

and th~ guarantee

the necessity

on a declaration

negotiate

the Austrian

state

treaty

In addition,
Federal

0£

of

freedom; she was prepared

to

neutrality

and she was willing

Chancellor

and State

On April
Austria,

to Moscow consisted

Dr. Adolf Schaerf,

Secretary

their

however, that

be approved by all

the Allies.

Powers of the visit

The meeting in Moscow lasted

in the Austrian
treaty

Tne results

of this

communique. 5 The main points

and all

delegation

conference

the fate

steps.

its

They

provisions

had to

the Western

of the Austrian

were sUllllll8.I'izedin the official

of the communique were: (a) Austria

Ibid • , p. 41 •

5For text

a note to

4
to Moscow.

3Ibid.
4

Ing.

only three days, from April 12 to

April 15, 1955, but these days determined
future.

of Federal

Foreign Minister

On April 9, Moscow notified

of the Austrian

to

Dr. Bruno Kreisky.

confidence
the state

representatives

Council of Ministers

4, 1955, the Western Powers transmitted

expressing

indicated,

The delegation

Ra.ab, Vice-Chancellor

Leopold Figl,

to the Austrian

Ra.ab and other Austrian

come to Moscow. On March 29, 1955, the Austrian
the invitation.

to discuss

four Power conference. 3

at a special

Ing. Julius

The

the withdrawal

Molotov extended an invitation

Chancellor

accepted

Dreipunkteerklaerung.

to discuss

of Austria's

Ambassador in

of the communique see Appendix A.

would
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bec ome neutral.

She was willing

to follow a policy

similar

Switzerland.

The Soviet Union on the other hand expressed

to recognize

a declaration

willing

to that

to sign the treaty

effect;

immediately,

tons of crude oil;

all

all Austrian

Austrian

was overjoyed.

delegation

will

in its

Our war prisoners

be free,

were extraordinary.

Federal

and we will

Austria
their

assets

of the Danube

and (f) Russia

Chancellor

6

The

Raab telephoned

back our native

to

soil

These terms were much better

than the

to accept at Berlin in 1954.

April 19, 1955, Moscow sent a note to the Western Powers and

sugg esting

a conference

in Vienna. In

of the Foreign Ministers

answer of April 21, 1955, the Western Powers suggested

conference

in

for 10,000,000

of war in Russia.

receive

by

will be free again. 117These

ones the Western Powers were willing
On

to Austria

for $2,000,000;

prisoners

Vienna: "Austria

concessions

to accept the $150,000,000

(e) the USSRwould hand over all

promised to release

entirety.

(b) the Soviet Union was

oil interests

Steamship Company (DDSG) in Austria

her 'Willingness

and would withdraw her troops

the end of 1955; (c) the USSRwas willing
goods; (d) Russia would sell

to that of

of Ambassadors to examine the Moscow proposals.

in return
The USSR

ag::-eed, and the Ambassadors met in Vienna from May 2 to May 12, 1955.
The discussi ons centered
which was discussed

extensively

Powers was the question

6

New~

7 Ibid.,

ma.inly on three major points.
and which was finally

of the restitution

point

approved by all

of German property.

Times, April 16, 1955, p. 2.
April 15, - 1955, P• 1.

The first

The

a
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per iod within which the German property
down by the treaty.
into force
Austria.

The agreement was that

of the treaty,
In this

all

connection

value to German physical

to return

or juridical

ownership.

occupation

90 days after

troops within

another

In addition,

British

and American oil companies.

settled

by the state

treaty,

to

on adding another

German property

beyond a certain

Oil fields

had to remain

issue was the with-

It was agreed upon to withdraw all

treaty.

.All other issues

insisted

The second major conference
troops.

the entering

was to be returned

persons.

drawal of the occupation

was to be laid

two months after

German property
the Russians

clause which forbade Austria

under Austrian

should be returned

the entering

into force

of the

issue was brought up: the claims of French,
These claims,

but were dealt

were settled

however, were not

with in separate

agreements.8

at the Ambassadors Conference,

the only thing which remained to be done, was to sign the treaty.
was done on May 15, 1955, in the Marmorsaal of the Schloss
Prince Eugene's

beautiful

castle.

The Austrian

State

Har old Macmillan for the United Kingdom of Great Britain

Belyed.er~,

Republics,
and Northern

of America, Antoine Pinay

for Fr an ce, and Ing. Leopold Figl for the Republic
was free

This

Treaty was signed

by Vyacheslav M. Molotov for the Union of Soviet Socialist

Irel and , John F. Dulles for the United States

and

of Austria.

Austria

again.
On June

5, 1955, the Austrian Nationalrat

proclaim Austria's

8
siegler,

neutrality.

.Q.!2•ill•,

This proclamation

p. 43°

adopted a decision
was presented

to

to the

34
Nationalrat

on October 26, 1955, as a constitutional

law, and was

passed and entered i nto force on November 5, 1955.
On September 19, 1955, the last

ten years of hard struggle,
a free,

independent

Allied

soldier

of hope and frustration,

and sovereign

country.

left

Austria.

After

Austria was again

V

THEROLEOF TBEAUSTRIAN
COMMUNIST
PARTY
Though essential,
1945 and 1955 provides
the work undertaken

the chronological

account of the events between

only the very basic structure,

by the -writer. At this

examinat ion of Soviet policy toward Austria
point out t he changes helping
withdraw al from Austria

to create

of

point a more detailed
is indicated,

a situation

in order to

in which Soviet

became possible.

The Soviet policy in Austria had two distinct
approach was direct . Soviet actions
which will be discussed

the skeleton,

in

in more detail

was the use of the existing

Austrian

features.

the area concerned,

One

an approach

in Chapter VI. The other method
Connnunist Party.
influence

Through the Party

the Russians were able to exercise

indirect

on the population

and, what was even more important,

they could get control

over important

government positions.
One of the first
establishment

of local

of the Russians in Austria was the

administrations.

people "1ho were willing
Austrian

actions

These bodies were staffed

to carry out all Russian wishes. Members of the

Communist Party (Kommunistische Partei

short) were naturally
the Russians.
individuals
strengthening

First,

with

preferred,

Oesterreichs.

KPOe for

since they served the dual intention

the Russians were assured that trustworthy

were in these positions,

and second, it was a means of

the KPOe. 1 Russian efficiency

'

is seen in the fact that

1The following two chapters are ma.inly based on Adolf Schaerf,
Oesterreichs Erneuerung, ~-~ (Wien: Verlag der Wiener Volks-

of
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within

a few weeks after

districts

the Soviets

in the city had CoDID1unistpolice

Renner government was established,
Ministry

of Interior

and Religious

forces,

take-over.

for leading
of Interior,

an extremely

Ernst Fischer,

tools

In the struggle

weitere

said:

Austrian

important
another

Public

'Which provided

of the Austrian

for a future

Voraussetzung

dafuer,

Communist

him and the KPOe with all
Thus the

action.4

Koplenig,

Die Schaffung

Information

Communists. Franz Honner

position

for a new constitution,

11

einer

which finally

a KPOe representative

led to the
in

w.hren VoJ.ksdemokratie ist

dass sich die Geschichte

der letzten

buchhan dlung, 1956 ); and William L. Stearman, The Soviet Union~
OccuDati. on of Aust ria
(Wien: Verlag fuer Zeitarchieve,
1957).
2st earma.n, 212• git.,

the

high ranking member of the KPOe, was put

for future

of the 1929 version,

Parliament

of F.ducation,

of propaganda such as radio and press.3

ground was well prepared

adoption

succeeded in securing

giving him control

in charge of the other Ministry
the important

Vienna, 16 out of the 21

chiefs. 2 When the provisional

the Soviets

and the Ministry

Affairs

became the Minister
police

had entered

eine
Jahre

the

p. 57.

3 The preparations
for the successful
coup d'etat
in Czechoslovakia
i nclu ded among other things the infiltration
of the police forces with
Comnrunist elements; the attainment of important Cabinet positions
such as
the Ministry of Interior
and the Ministry of Information;
the control of
the administrations
on the local, district
and regional levels; and the
control of mass organizations
such as trade unions or youth groups.
Dana A. Schmidt, "The Communist Coup d'Etat, 11 Problems in International
Rel ations, Andrew Gyorgy and H. S. Gibbs, editors . (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1962), pp. 19-31.
4 Dr. Schaerf maint~ns that under the protection
of the Russians
an Austrian exile government was being set up in Yugoslavia.
Schaerf, .!m• cit.,
p. 29.
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nicht noch einmal wiederholen kann. 115This statement
the future

means for achieving

although extremely important,

under Russian occupation

on the trade unions.
in this respect.

In Austria,

There

unions and the Austrian

"Wa.S

fractions

of mass organizations.

the Communist parties

however, their

efforts

very close cooperation

Socialist

the workers in the factories.
of socialist

were not the sole

the Communist aims. The KPOe attempted to create

popular support through the formation

(Austrian

no doubt about

plans for Austria.

Government posts,

countries

left

Party.

betweoo. the trade

control

Yet the KPOewas by no means troubled

by the formation

Gewerkschaftsbund

in the enterprises

prevented the KPOefrom getting
6
the workers.

heavily

The KPOe attempted to organize

of the Oesterreichische

tactic

relied

were frustrated

This move -was counteracted

Trade Union Association)

In other

concerned,

and this

over the trade unions and

by these developments.

Its

optimism was enormous. In a Communist meeting at the Kosmoskino in
Vienna on October 26, 1945, Ernst Fischer
May

1, 1946, the two workers'

the only grave miscalculation.

parties

The KPOe expected to 'Win 25 to 30 per cent

of the votes in the upcoming elections,
earlier

part of this

expressed the opinion that by
would be united. 7 But this was not

a point already

indicated

at an

thesis.

5The creation of a true people's democracy is another safeguard
against a repetition
of the events of the last years. (Writer's
translation).
Schaerf, ~- cit., p. 53.
6
7

Ibid.,

p. 75.

Ibid.,

p. 76.

38
The large-scale
1

the writer
struggle

defeat

s opinion one of the most decisive

for freedom.

plans for Austria.

of Interior

and Religious

Affairs.

and the Ministry

of F.ducation,

The KPOe had lost

control

It now had to change its

new methods to achieve its

aims. The KPOe still

and even got one Cabinet post,

Electrification;

but the important

The Austrian
most of their

Socialist

channels

chance to diminish

police

of Interior.
forces,

When the Soviets

police

police

force.

in the police

charge of the difficult

four seats

in

of Power and
had been cut off.

People 1 s Party made
wherever possible.

Party and the Communist Party

Oskar Helmer, a Socialist,

the difficulty

events will
entered

became the new

forces

of Communist elements.

and importance

of this

task,

be necessary.

Austria,

The Russians

force by very carefully

. . . and

retained

Communist influence

Austria

immediately

filling

Communists. A Communist publication

"

and look for

of influence

the Vienna police,

understand

a bri ef re view of earlier

effective

Information

He faced the monumental task of purging the

in particular

In order to fully

Public

tactics

Party and the Austrian

did not materialize.

Minister

blow to Soviet

over the most important

the Ministry

The expected union between the Socialist
naturally

was in

events in Austria's

This was a severe and perhaps fatal

of government.

Parliament

elections

Five per cent of the votes were not enough to retain

the Ministry

agencies

of the KPOe in the first

important

was without

an

established

a new

positions

of 1945 gives evidence

with loyal
of this

facta

it was again the Communists who were in

and unrewarding

task of the reconstruction

in

8
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the first

few months."9

The head of the Austrian

police

forces

at that

time was Dr. Duermayer, a high ranking member of the KPOe. This was the
situation

Minister

Helmer had to face after

important

step was to transfer

do little

harm. Dr. Duerijla.yer, however, preferred

Holaubek,

a Socialist,

Communists protested

loyal

Austrian

in vain against

this

that move. The further

important

one defeat

the border the other Communist parties

task,

government

task and in creating

These developments
to more drastic

after

the other,

in Czechoslovakia

apparently

a new and

and Hungary were

means in order to retain

two attempts

to overthrow the government by force.

one of the major motivations

took place in the spring

.QI2• ill•,

while across

convinced the KPOe that

This was possibly

9schaerf,

elimination

was a long and difficult

the Soviets.

attempts

The

(see Table II).

Thus the KPOe suffered

they had to resort

Joseph

forces.

had to be overcome. 10 Yet the Austrian

police

very successful.

to resign.

became the new head of the police

succeeded in accomplishing

The first

Dr. Duermayer to Salzburg where he could

of Communists from the ranks of the police
and many obstacles

he took office.

The first

the favor of
for their
of these

of 1947. 11

p. 146.

10stearman points out that the Soviets still
exercised a great deal
of control over the police forces in their zone. They opposed an increase
in the police forces, had several training
schools closed, and prohibited
adequate arming of the forces.
Stearman, .QI2• cit., p. 60.
11

This attempt took place at the same time as the Hungarian
Communists successfully
completed the government take-over in Hungary.
On May 30, 1947, Premier Ference Nagy had to resign,
and the Communist
were in complete control.
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On May 15, 1947, the KPOe organized

a strike

number of workers marched to the Ballhausplatz,
Chancellory,

_the seat of the Federal

'Where the Communist representatives

the cro'Wd. Franz Honner said among other thingsa
its

present

composition is not able to realize

situation,

in Vienna. A large

in Parliament

If the government in

11

the seriousness

then it simply will have to be dissolvea.

This speech left

very little

addressed

of the

12

11

doubt about the intentions

of the

KPOe. However, the Communists did not have enough popular support.
minor incidents
failure.

took place and the putsch had to be written

Dr. Schaerf points

the relations

out several

times that after

between the Russians and the Austrian

failure

to participate

Bureau) seems to

Yet the KPOe"Wasnot "Willing to admit its defeat.
given by Kristovic

Binder, Austrian

July 1947, Ernst Fischer
Communist-controlled

treaty.

this

this view. 1 3

substantiate

· otherwise

off as a

Communist Party did

cool off markedly . The fact that the KPOewas not invited
in the newly formed Cominform (Communist Information

Only

People's

Party,

government. He was also quick to point out that
to sign an Austrian

he demarrled the removal of unpleasant

members such as Foreign Minister

12schaerf,

at the beginning of

promised generous Russian support for a new

the Soviet Union would not be willing
In addition,

At a dinner party

ill2• cit.,

Gruber or Minister

government

of Interior

Helmer. 14

p. 162.

13The Communist parties of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary,
Russia, Poland, France, Czechoslovakia and Italy were all represented.
14

lifil!

~

Times, June 8, 1947.
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This offer

caused considerable

in Hungary and other satellite
causing much unrest

countries.

of any such offer

Socialist

Party and the Austrian

stability.

15
Then Austria

rejected

Although the KPOe succeeded in

in government circles

rejection

could not prevent

concern in view of the developments

and among the people,

by the two coalition
People's

Party,

decided to participate
Austria

from signing

by the Soviet Union),

government in protest.

and its

soon restored

this

unrest

internal

Plan.

The KPOe

agreement (lolhich was openly

member resigned

In 1950 the KPOe ma.de a last

the existing

the Austrian

in the Marshall

bring about a change in the government by force.
exploited

parties,

the firm

from the

desperate

attempt

to

It very skillfully

among the workers about the new Lohn-und

Preisabkommen (Wage and Price Agreement) by demanding a much greater
increase

in -wages than was provided
The strike

traffic
pro-Nazi

started

for by the new agreement .

on September 26, 1950. Strikers

in Vienna. Some non-Communist workers joined
Independents

blocked the

the strike.

The

League openly aided the KPOe.16 On September 29,

the KPOa suddenly called

off the strike.

On September

30, a Communist-

sponsored meeting of the All-Austrian

Shop Stewards Conference took

place,

to the Austrian

Austrian

and an ultimatum

-was submitted

government rejected

15Schaerf,

.QJ'.2• cit.,

the ultimatum,

government.

The

and on October 3, 1950, a

pp. 163-170.

16 In connection with this strike the US High Commissioner Lieut.
Gen. Geoffrey Keyes ~aised a number of charges against the Soviet Union
for aiding the strikers.
Among those charges were: Soviet army trucks had
brought workers into the city; Soviet interference
'With the actions of the
Austrian police, e.g. in Sankt Poelten where employees of the Soviet
controlled
enterprises
had occupied the railroad plants.
~ York Times.
September 30, 1950.
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general

strike

was proclaimed.

workers in Upper Austria,

In the begimling a fairly

Styria,

The Austrian
tinually
appeal.

Trade Union Association

appealed to the strikers

action

in the Western provinces.

and the Austrian

government con-

not to follow the Communist strike

In the Western provinces the political

soon realized

and Vienna participated.

Lower Austria

There was, however, hardly any violent

large number of

and the workers started

nature

of the strike

to go back to work. On October

1950, it had become clear that the strike

wa.s a complete failure

We0ter n zones. It was only in the Russian zone that the strike

t emporary success,

due to some local Russian support.

McCormick of the~~
Austria

was

4,

in the
had a

Anne O'Hare

Times gave an account of the actions

in Lower

and Vienna.

In a few centers in the Russian zone of Lower Austria the post and
telegraph offices were occupied and workers were driven out of
factories
by Communist terrorists
with the tacit connivance of the
Russian authorities
••••
In the tenth district
of Vienna 400
Communists seated themselves on rails.
The Russians prevented police
forces from interfering.
Suddenly four truck loads of building
workers arrived and chased them away.17
Stearman also points

out the important role of the flying

Austrian

Trade Union Association
Communist workers. 18
Because of a serious

did not allow Austrian police
office

which were of great help in figh~ing

incident
forces

held by the Communist strikers,

th e Allied

in Wiener Neustadt,
to intervene

17New X2r.kTimes, October 5, 1950.
.QR•

cit.,

p. 123.

'

the

.

where the Soviets

and reoccupy a post

the Austrian

Council to stop Russian interference.

18stearman,

squads of the

government appealed to

American and British

troops

43
were on alert
assist

and were equipped with huge rolls

the Austrian police

of barbed wire in order to

if necessa.ry. 19 It was not necessary.

October 5, 1950, the Presidium of the All-Austrian
called

off the strike.

The KPOehad suffered

Stearman in commentin!I on the strike
during these strikes,

senseless

On

Shop Stewards Conference

another big setback.

William

wrotes "The excesses 'Which took place

sabotage acts

•••

, severely

damaged

the Conununist chances beyond repair. 1120.
From that time on until
danger to the Austrian

1955 the KPOeno longer presented

government. All these failures

KPOenot only in the eyes of the Austrian
eyes of the Russian occupation

forces.

population,

This latter

had discredited

abortive

uutsch in

19New York Times, October 5, 1950.
20stearman,

QQ•

cit., p. 124.

the

but also in the

assumption might very

well explain why the Russians ceased to render any important
to the KPOe during the last

any real

1950.

assistance

VI
SOVIET TECHNIQUES
IN AUSTRIA
The Austrian

Communist Party was without

for the implementation
been pointed

out,

of Soviet

the Russians

policy
tried

doubt one of the main tools

in Austria.

Yet, as has already

to pursue their

aims not only through

the Communist Party but also by other means. In many cases they took the
necessary
threat

steps

themselves.

of interference,

Direct

posed a serious

government had to reckon at all

countries,

of great

in Austria

with the situation

power in Austria.

after

in the

difference.

Russia

She had to share her power in

Council with the other Western Allies,
importance

or often the mere

danger with which the Austrian

one has to remember a significant

was not the only occupation
the Allied

interference,

times.

When comparing the situation
satellite

Soviet

a fact

which proved to be

the second Control Agreement. 1 Yet despite

that,

'

her policy

was very successful,

The Soviets,
the question

particularly

undoubtedly,

of German assets

Potsdam Agreement concerning

in the Eastern

were most successful

in Austria.

The rather

zone.

in their

handling

vague clause

German assets 2 proved to be a perfect

of

in the
tool

for

the Russians.
When they entered
in the north

Austria

they immediately

of Vienna (the second largest

the machinery was "exported"

to the East.3

occupied the oil fields

in Europe).

A large

portion

of

In Augui;it 1945, the Soviet

1see Chapter l, P• 9.
verband

3In 1947 in a study undertaken by the Oesterreichische
Industriellen(Association
of Austrian Industrialists)
the replacement value of
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government claimed all
Austria

rights

of production

under the German assets

resulted
Allies.

in strong protests

maintained

of the 1943 Declaration

in Enemy Controlled
The Soviets

then approached the issue

joint

management of the oil industry.

joint

this

action

constituted

different

oil company for the

5 This plan was modelled after

economic agreement of May 8, 1945. The Soviet
was to consist

the area under discussion,

while Austria

in the Ge:nnan assets

rights

sixt y yea rs . The capital

value of the Russian contribution

dollars;

in the whole of Austria

the Austrian

The re st of about 13 billion
gover nment within a period

dollars

the

contribution
located

in

-was supposed to grant the

Rus si an s t he e.~ploration

,2bil lion

of Property

from a slightly

of an Austro-Soviet

undertaking

at

a

Territory.4

They proposed the formation

to this

that

government and the Western

Regarding Forced Transfer

angle.

Rumanian-Soviet

of the Potsdam Agreement. This

from the Austrian

The Western Allies

violation

clause

in Eastern

and exploration

contribution

for a period

of

was estimated

only at 500,000 dollars.

was to be paid by the Austrian

of five years.

placed under a Russian Director-General.

The whole company was to be
No Austrian

official

was to hold a

the machinery removed by the Russians from Austria was estimated at about
1 billion dollars.
William L. Stearman,~
Soviet Union .fil!9.~
Occupation of Austria (Wien: Verlag fuer Zeitarchieve,
1957), p. 48.

4This Declaration regarded as non-valid any transfer
of property
ri ghts which had been effected by open blunder or by transactions
under
duress even when these were apparently legal in form. Since most of the
properties
now claimed by the Russians did not constitute
German assets
under the meaning of the above Declaration,
the Soviets actually took
Austrian pr oper ty.
Department of State, The Austrian State Tre aty (An
Account of Postwar Negotiations
Together with the Text of the Treaty
and related Documents. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), P• 6.
5Adolf Schaerf, Oesterreichs Erneuerung, 1.21i:2.-12il
(Wiens Verlag
der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1956), PP• 64-65.

comparable position.6
These conditions
11

Der Vertrag

very adequately:

'soci e tas l eonina',

einer

erschien

the Austrian

time,

below the surface.

one can easily

The realization

agreement the Russians

Austria

required

13 billion

dollars.

provided

Austria

their

influence

capital

thereby

Yet this

the

would not have
this

Austro-

would have been to get the

that

however, rejected
a future

split

even more dependent

all

On July

the proposed agreement,

of the country

was only the beginning

by the Russians.

order to the effect

6Ibid.,

to establish

which would have made Austria

government,

prevented

and West Austria.
exploitation

the entire

of the Soviet Union.

The Austrian
and probably

of

also to the Western

The Western powers certainly

company. Tne only other possibility

on the good will

On the basis

would have never been able to raise

with the necessary

money from the Russians

see the dangers

would have been able to penetrate

economy, thus extending

In addition,

Soviet

Communists

of the plan would have

meant almost complete economic dependence on Russia.

zones.

einer

the plan wholeheartedly.

which lurked

Austrian

plan

in welcher der eine nur Rechte

hat. 117Naturally,

Looking back now on that

this

this

mir als Musterbeispiel

Gesellschaft,

und der andere nur Pflichten
supported

Dr. Schaerf describes

were ridiculous.

into East

of the economic

6, 1947 , General Kurassov issued

German property

in the Russian

an

zone would be

p. 65.

7 11This agreement was in my opinion an excellent
example of a
'societas
leonina',
an · agreement where one party has only rights while
the other one has onlyduties.11
Ibid.

1
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t r ansfe r r ed into Russian O'W11ership.8 In the execution
Red Army occupied the enterprises
contr ol.

The capital

concerned

of this

order the

and placed them under Soviet

was handed over to the recently

established

Russian

St a t.e Bank . 9
On

July 1 o, 1946, the Austrian

claims . The issue
Allied

Council.

definition

was brought up several
The Russians

German assets.

presented

Nationalization

rejected

definition

to accept

from the Soviet

it and insisted

government had passed the

by the Russian occupation

The Russians

forces.

The Soviet

attempts

Council were frustrated

Council meeting on August 20, 1946, the Soviets

maintained

Nationalization

resorted

Act was a constitutional

unanimous approval

of the Allied

was also rejected

8Stearman,
9schaerf,

.Q;Q..

At the Allied
that

law and as such required

Council before

entering

to

by Western

technique.

Austrian
Austrian

on the

of 1943. It was impossible

to a different

10

of the

Union, since it extended to a number of enter-

have the Act vetoed by the Allied

proposition

of the

Act of July 26, 1946. Thia Act met with vigorous

seized

opposition.

the Soviet ·

point. 10

In the meantime the Austrian

prises

an official

down by the London Declaration

to reach an agreement on this

firmly

times at the meetings

The Western Powers refused

laid

opposition

Parliament

the
the

into force.

by the Western Powers. 11 When all

This

these moves

cit. , p. 4.6 •

QQ.• cit.,

p. 118.

In order to realize fully how disastrous
economy see Table III on the percentage
corporations.

this move was to the
of German ownership of

11 The US member of the Allied Council said in this connection:
" • • • ,;mat did the Soviet government think they were signing when they
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failed

the Russians

representative

fell

back on an earlier

to the Allied

statement

of their

Councils

The Soviet command on the basis of Article 2(d) of the Control
Agreement of June 28, 1946, reserves the right in the Zone of Austria
controlled
by it to take such action to safeguard the interest
of the
Soviet Union as it may consider necessary.12
This meant, in other words, that
provisions

of the Nationalization

The Soviets
seized

the Soviets

enterprises.

Imushchestva

Act in their

They established

y Avstrii

the USIA enterprises
economic life.

pay truces and social

to these

in Austria),
Bank, which

enterprises,

making

They also set up the Soviet

Austria
a large

of the benefits
part

of her entire

of the industry

had some other very harmful - effects

Protected

of the

14

Aside from depriving
and from taking

rates

on the Russians.

Oil Administration.

resources

for Soviet Property

own bank, the Soviet State

loans with very high interest

Mineral

oYn administration

the Upravlenye Soyietskovo

(.Administration

them even more dependent

to apply the

zone of occupation.

now proceeded to set up their

USIA for short. 1 3 They had their
granted

refused

by their

insurance

Russian administrators,

contributions.

oil

out of her economy,
upon the Aust r ian
they refused

to

This meant, on the one hand,

signed this new Control Agreement, that is in connection with the
constitutional
law? Just what did you think a constitutional
law was when
you signed it for your Government? I knew exactly what I was doing when
I signed it for my Government." United States Forces in Austria, Report
.Q.f th e Uni te d States High Connnissioner . (Washington: United States Forces,
August 1946), p. 12 • .
12
. Ibid • , p. 8. ·
13m 1954 there were about 324 USIA enterprises
employing 46,780 workers.
Schaerf, .Ql?.• cit., p. 121.
14stearma.n,

.Ql?.• cit.,

pp. 52-53.

in Austria
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that
On

the Austrian

government lost

part

of the desperately

the ot her hand, it enabled the USIA retail

established
price

between 1950 and 1952, to sell

stores,

These enterprises,
als o a political

All these

the Werkschutz , a paramilitary

enterprises

organization

to undermine

even for a very good

goods of Austrian

however, represented

danger.

an attempt

time it was difficult

patr i ot to buy the more expensive

which were

far below the established

(10 to 50 per cent). 15 This was undoubtedly

th e Aust ri an economy. At that

needed income.

stores.

not only an economic but
had a small private

consisting

of about 2,000

members in the Russian zone. These members were mostly Austrian
but some of them came from other countries.

16 It is important

here that

were of decisive

these paramilitary

organizations

during the Communist take-over
efforts

to solve the question

well as at the international
the USIA enterprises

until

in Czechoslovakia.

table,

the signing

it will

be helpful

t he very beginning
Austrian

to briefly

discuss

of the occupation

communications system.

.QJ2.•

cit.,

Austria

herself,

had to live

as

with

Treaty in 1955.

some ot he r Russian tactics.
the Russians

were in control

From
of the

They had occupied the Telephone and

were entitled

15JM£..' p. 54.
16schaerf,

out

of the Russian methods in Austria

Tel egra ph Exchange at the Schillerplatz
Alth ough the Western Allies

to point
importance

in Austria

of the State

To give a more complete picture

Communists,

·Despite continuous

of the German assets
conference

a:rrrry,

p. 121.

in the first

district

to equal access,

of Vienna.
the Russians
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managed to keep the control
the latter

largely

in their

ow hands. It was not until

half of 1953 that some of the censorship

Russians during all

exercised

by the

these years was abolished.

With similar

efficiency

the Russians controlled

the press.

Their

interpretation

of the Press Decree issued by the Allied Council on
17
October 11, 1945,
enabled them to suppress any anti-Soviet
propaganda.

In the Allied

Council meeting on July 11, 1952, it was pointed

out that

since the beginning of that year 103 papers had been banned; 111 book
titles

permanently

banned; and 3012 books seized in the mails by the

Soviet censors. 18
Aoouctions and midnight arrests
of the Soviet tactics.

represented

another

The Russians not only arrested

zone, but they also arrested

integral

part

people in their

them in Western zones or the Western sectors

in Vienna. In many cases they went so far as to arrest

high ranking

government officials
Austrian

police

such as Oberinspektor Anton Marek, a leading
19
officer.
These actions led t? numerous protests

Allies

and the Austrian

either

denied the charges or refused

Soviet technique
useful

government with very little

served at least

means to remove certain

might cause trouble
could not fail

unpleasant

to have the desired

popul ati on . Fear and uncertainty

to answer at all.

two purposes.

or frustrate

effect.

First,

by the

The Russians

This part of the
aoouctions

were a

persons from places were

they

Soviet aims. Second, these aoouctions
psychological
on part

effect

upon the

of the population

17stearman, .QI?.• ill•, P• 73.
18 Ibid., p. 74.
19 Ibid., p. 65.

led to a
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gre ate r will ingn ess of the people to submit to Soviet
All t hese techniques,
suc cess by th e Soviet
control

as wel l as others,

forces

over t he Austrian

to intimidate

government.

the s e pra cti ces were discontinued,
noti ce abl e degree.

rule.

were used with varying

the population

It was not until

and the situation

and to get

1953 that

some of

improved to any

VII
SOVIETFOREIGN
POLICYAFTERSTALIN
The foreign
policy

policy

of a country is an integral

of the government.

international

Internal

developments.

events often

A country's

foreign

not conducted in a vacuum. The international
country concerned has to respond is just
foreign

policy

as are the developments

field
It is,

isolated

a re-evaluation

therefore,

important

to consider

issue,

but to see it

le aders hip affected

dE:ath will provide

in determining

in the domestic

to understand

of the country's
the Austrian

Important

international

foreign

question

policy.

not as an

to other international

aims in Austria

however, will

events.

solution

at that

to Stalin's

of the events

be put on the international

the close connection

Only against

prior

death and developments

and some of the other international
time.

the

changes in the international

question

toward Austria.

on its

the background for an understanding

situat ion at the time of Stalin's

European theater

effects

field.

is

policy.

of the Soviet

afte r 1953. The main emphasis,

is important

furthermore,

to examine how the changes in the Soviet

Soviet foreign

A br ie f di scussion

policy,

as important

in relation

At the same time it is necessary

shape the course of

to which the

in the same way as significant

might necessitate

of the overall

situation

changes 'Within the country will have their
relations,

part

thereafter

between the Austrian

problems which were awaiting

the background of developments

and in Russia herself

. It

can one understand

Soviet

in the
policy

I.

I n 1945 all
Aust ria

the evidence

as another

occupation
Austrian

Soviet

forces
police

after
forces

government positions
and Religious

direction.

SOVIETAIMS IN AUSTRIA

satellite.

their

Austrian

as in Czechoslovakia,

envisaged

of the Soviet

into Austria--getting

and the Ministry

actions

the Russians

The actions

entry

or putting

that

control

of Education,

of Interior--all

Public

Information

point

in this

were taken in other Russian-occupied

where they finally

of the

J

Communists in leading

such as the Ministry

Affairs

Similar

indicates

led to a successful

countries,
overthrow

of the government (see Chapter V, p. 36).
The election
longer

defeat

after

Union had no intention
economic field,
with actions

of withdrawing

of the local

Union's

tight

behind the Iron Curtain.

from Austria.

abductions

police,

are all

The

to make at least

empire . This policy,

Germany. German unification

testimony

the interference

to the fact

zone of Austria

the assumption

the Eastern

part

as is well know,

is still

The measures in the

and arrests,

grip over the Eastern

These measures justify

Union was trying

could no

1945, however, points to the fact that the Soviet

the . harassments,

means loosened.

satellite

these hopes. Stalin

expect to bring the whole of Austria

Russia,.~ policy

Soviet

of 1945 shattered

that

that

the

was by no
the Soviet

of Austria

part

of her

was very successful

one of the big unsolved

in

problems in

Europe.
The main reason why a similar
again be found in the developments
the situation

policy
after

did not succeed in Austria

the 1945 elections.

in Germany where two separate

Contrary

can
to

governments were established,

54
one for the Weste rn zones and one for the Eastern
Austr ia was governe d from Vienna.
Au3t ria was unified
in all

applicable

at least

On the basis

the zones.

True, the Soviet

Act, but the main instrument
absent.

bound to fail

of the 1945 elections

on the government level.

enf orcement in many cases in their

regime--was

zone, the whole of

in the long run.

Union frustrated

zone, for instance

of Soviet

'lnus Soviet

All laws were

policy--the

activities

the Nationalization

Communist puppet

were severely

The two abortive

the law

limited

and

by the Austrian

attempts

and to

Communist Party to overthrow the government by violence

and force

establish

which made it

a true people's

even more difficult
willing

democracy were other

to realize

to admit defeat,

negotiations

In order to better

t he last

few years

is ne cessary

the signing

policy

situation

toward Austria
State

Treaty,

in the early

in
it

50 1 s,

'Which helped to shape Russian

SOVIET FOREIGNPOLICYAFTERSTALIN
had succeeded

by 1950, characterized

integration
major setbacks

in establishing

by large-scale

with the Soviet

and firm

of the Greek guerilla

a protective

The Berlin

intervention

fighters

belt

economic, political

Union, Russian foreign

in other areas.

e due to immediate

the support

in the

years.

~nough the Soviets
of sa tel lites

tactics

of the Austrian

of the developments

in these
II.

a failur

the Soviet

to look at the international

fore ign policy

suffered

to delaying

was not

treaty.

understand

before

and to give an account

a.~d social

the Russian aims. Yet Stalin

and he resorted

for an Austrian

setbacks

blockade
by the

policy

had

proved to be

Western

through the Balkan

Allies;

55
allies

1

in American aid under the TrumanDoctrine;

resulted

Russian attempt
the other
It led,

to make Yugoslavia

satellite

countries

on the contrary,

into a satellite

failed

after

due to Marshall

to a severe rift

within

and the
the pattern

Tito's

resistance.

the Communist bloo. 2 At

the time of the 19th Party Congress in Moscow the situation
Communist parties
an in crease

in Europe had by no means improved.

in membership recorded.

f r om 45,000 to 33,000;
45, 000 to 16,000;

The existing
Soviet

fo reign

desired results.
pressure

international

policy.

Direct

situation
military

Now the Soviet

that

an explanation

in Demna.rk from

by 50 per cent.3
called

actions

for a reappraisal

had failed

or delaying

to bring the

to new tactics,
tactics.

of

slow

It is in this

can be found for the stalemate

t he negotiations

on the German and Austrian

might be another

explanation

Russia was probably

was

and in Switzerland,

Union had to resort

upon non-Communist countries

change in tactics

Only in Italy

in France from 907,000 to 506,000;

in Norway from 40,000 to 7,000;

of the other

membership had dropped

In Great Britain

Sweden and Holland the membership decreased

of

treaties.

for the lack of initiative

in

The Korean War
in the West.

more concerned with problems in the Far East than

1J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics .Qf Soviet .Foreign Policy
(London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 27.
2 Tb.e rift

between Moscow and Belgrad in 1948 was ma.inly based on
the rivalry between the two countries.
Tito's plan of a Balkan Federation
was a direct challenge to the predominant position of the Soviet Union in
this ar ea. The independent course of Yugoslavia led to the expulsion of
the Yugoslav Communist Party from the Cominform. It was not until after
Stalin's
death that relations
improved again.
31-1ackintosh, .Qn• ill•,

p. 70.
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i.dth a speedy settlement
Stalin's

for Soviet

a gr oup of new leaders

struggle

appeared.

leadership.4

foreign

policy.

Individual

The transition

was tried

and later

leadership

was not effected

on executed.

As already

The contacts

indicated

Soviet

i.dthout

by

a

to overthrow the

of the first

foreign

technical

Greece and Yugoslavia

Mr. Mackintosh observes,

policy

on Germany and Austria

in the United Nations
,nth

was replaced

secretary

of

5

The negotiations

participation

death

On March 25., 1953,

Khrushchev succeeded Malenkov to the position
the Communist party.

in as much as it
After Stalin's

for power. Beria was charged i.dth attempting

government,

death.

questions.

death on March 5, 1953, was decisive

opened new possibilities

collective

of the German and Austrian

was stagnant

were deadlocked.
organizations

at Stalin's
Russia's

was minimal.

had almost ceased to exist.

Russia was so "isolated

that

As

it was practically

4

The new leadership
consisted of G. M. Malenkov who was premier
and first
secretary of the Communist party, and L. P. Beria, V.M. Molotov,
N. A. Bul ganin and L.M. Kaganovich all deputy premiers.
Ibid., p. 72.
11
0ne of the fundamental principles
of party leadership
is
in deciding all important problems of party work. No matter
collectivity
how experienced leaders may be, no matter what their knowledge and
and
ability,
they do not possess and they cannot replace the initiative
experience of a whole collective."
Pravda as cited in Current Digest Qi
the Soviet Press, Vol. V, No. 13, p. 3.
511
A plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union held March 14, 1953, adopted the following resolution:
1. to grant the request of Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers
Comrade G. M. Malenkov to be released from the duties of Secretary of the
Party Central Committee; 2. to elect the following Secretariat
of the
Party Central Committee: Comrades N. s. Khrushchev, M.A. Suslov, P. N.
Pospelov, N. N. Shatalin and S. D. Ignatyev. 11 Pravda and Izvestia in the
Current Digest Q1: the Soviet Press, Vol. V, No. 8, p. 12.
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impossi ble to have a positive
The new leaders
in order to decrease
consolidation.

Russians
thing,

international

tensions

aircrafts

a conference

during the period
direction.

safety

consent.

Diplomatic

Yugos l avia decreased,
r e- est ablishment

relations

the Soviet

of full

diplomatic

a collision

zone of Germany, the

as Secretary-General

Union now gave her
The attacks

on

government proposed the

relations

ons between Turkey and the Soviet

i mpr ovement. Pravda reported

After

were resumed with Israel.

and in June the Soviet

of internal

over Germany. For another

having opposed Dag Harm:narskjold's appointment

of th e United Nations for a long time,

relati

some of the contacts

over the Soviet

on air

116

affairs.

in restoring

moves point in this

and Soviet

suggested

in international

were interested

7 Several

between British

policy

with Yugoslavia.

Union too witnessed

The

a marked

on July 19, 1953:

In t he name of preserving good neighborly relations
and
st r engthening peace and security,
the Governments of Georgia and
Ar meni a ha$e found i t possible to renounce their territorial
claims
on Turkey.
,
•
Thi s political
ti me the Soviet
war in Kqrea,

6

thaw also extended to the Far East.

Union agreed to voluntary

a proposal

Mackintosh,

QI?.•

repatriation

'Which she had rejected

ill•,

until

For the first

of prisoners
that

time.

of

The

p. 74.

7During all these months i mportant chan ges took place in the
government s of the Ukraine Republic, Belorussian Republic, Armenian
Republic, Georgian Republic or Azerbaidzhan Republic, to mention only
a f ew. These reforms consisted mainly in bringing in new men or in
amalgamating ministries.
8

Curren t Digest .Qf the Soviet~'

Vol. V, No. 29. pp. 21-22.
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exchange of wounded and sick prisoners

of war started

On July

was signed.

27, 1953, the Korean Armistice

The improvement in the international
similar

conciliatory

Pravda and Izvestia

climate

measures of the Russians

on April

20, 1953.9

was paralleled

within

Austria.

by

On June 7,

reported:

The USSR Council of Ministers has pronounced it no longer
expedient to combine in one person the functions of USSRHigh
Commissioner in Austria and Commander in Chief of the Soviet forces.
Therefore the Commander in Chief has been relieved of his duties as
High Commissioner and his activity
restricted
to command of Soviet
forces in Austria.
Ambassador I. I. Ilyichev has been appointed USSRHigh
Commissioner in Austria.10
This was followed
Austrian

by an announcement that

the Soviet

government had agreed to give their

embassy status.

Certain

other alleviations

Union and the

diplomatic

representations

were granted.

Austria

was

allowed to have air mail communications with the German Democratic
Republic,

the West German Republic and Japan.11

On July

I. I. Ilyichev

JO, ,1953, the USSRHigh Commissioner
sent a note to the Austrian

in Austria

government indicating

from then on the Soviet Union would pay her ov1ncosts

that

for the occupation

forces:
In connection with the desire expressed by the Austrian
government, the USSR government deems it possible,
starting
August 1, 1953, to take over all expenses connected with maintaining
Soviet occupation forces in Austria, and thus to free the Austrian
state budget of these expenses.12

J.B.

9David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy
Lippincott Company, 1961), 126.
10current

Digest of the Soviet

11 Ibid • , No. 24, p. 1 2.

Press,

After Stalin

(New York:

Vol. V, No. 23, p. 20.

12 Ibid • , No. 31 , p. 17.
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In the meeting

of the Allied

ms de cided to end quadripartite
Council meeting
a bolished

censorship

on Ausgust 28, 1953, all

in Austria.

control
-

In another

Allied

over communication was

as of September 1, 1953. This meant that

t el ephone , as well as radio

on August 14, it

Council in Austria

postal,

telegraph

and

communications were again under Austrian

control.
Yet despite

these alleviations

did not make any concessions
In fact,

she fell

on the basic

the "abbreviated

version

of the treaty

treaty.

issue

in the Allied

was repeated

until

of the Austrian

Union also continued

Council of engaging in militarist

very vague and non-committal,

but at least

of Foreign Minister

Union
treaty.

she was not going to

the Western Allies

out the demanded denazification.

An observation

the Soviet

111
3 T'ne demand for withdrawal

with the Russian demand. The Soviet

not carrying

Austria,

back on the old argument that

discuss

Austria

within

Statements

of this
did comply

to accuse
activities
on Austria

and of
were

they were not 'Wholly negative.

Molot ov may serve as an illustration.

As regards the Austrian treaty,
the Soviet Union considered and
considers that here also there are no questions which cannot be
solved on the basis of previously achieved understanding,
given the
$ observance
of the democratic rights of the Austrian
effecti
pe ople. 4

1

13The "abbreviated treaty" does not provide for any decision which
could facilitate
restoration
of a truely independent democratic Austrian
state. At the same time it leaves the door open for restoration
of a
fascist
regime and the transformation
of Austria into a satellite
of the
American aggress ors. The "abbreviated treaty" also completely ignores the
Potsdam decision on the transfer
to the Soviet Union of German assets in
East Austria , an omission Yhich is clearly directed against the Soviet
Ibid., No• .3, p. 18.
Union. Prav da and Izvestia.

14Ibid., No • . 20, P• 7.

One might ask at thi s point why the Soviets
conciliatory
treaties?
foreign

moves, continued
Three possible

policy

evide nce that

suggest

out-ward unity
control

explanations
themselves

t he Russians

t he re organization

to procrastinate

at that

time.

countries

Sovie t t roops with brutal
al l Sovi et attempts

Yugoslavia's

to bring that

developme.~ts required

the full

support

this

settlement

independent

in

course defied

on the

-was obtained
tension.

of Russia,

by
Since

maintenance

and German peace

The second reason for the

and German questions

international

problems.

during the last

therefore,

Aust r ia or Germany, and, therefore,

a credible

took refuge

about both questions,

was
The stalemate

few years

involved

the new regime simply did not have a new and definite

statements

The Soviet

power. In order to

. This truce

attention

These two questions

of t he East and the West. It is,

committal

The

by the June revolt

on the Austrian

of Austrian

on the treaties
fact.

such as

quo in Europe might be a very simple one. No

pr obably one of the most difficult

rule

cracks.

to reduce .international

would only be advantageous.

in t he negotiations

affairs

proble ms, a temporary truce

of th e sta tus quo in the negotiations

maint enan ce of the status

is ample

republics.

country under their

internal

some of th e above mentioned steps

one d oubt s that

with internal

was challenged

in t ernati onal scene -was more than desirable

t r eaties

there

over East Germany and -was crushed by the

force.

be able t o cope with these

internal

First,

bloc showed very serious

which spread all

these

of the seeming dichotomy in Russian

were preoccupied

of the Soviet

all

on the German and Austrian

of the governments in the various

over the satellite

East Berlin,

despite

the vital

of Stalin's
interests

assumption
policy

that

toward

in vague and non-

yet still

leaving

the door
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open for future
in foreign

negotiations.

policy

at that

Vyacheslav M. Molotov, the Russian expert

time, might provide

the third

explanation.

Molotov was a staunch believer

in Stalinist

hardly

major changes in Soviet foreign

expect him to introduce

According to Professor

Dallin,

principles,

conciliatory

trends

to create

a favorable

on. Professor

international

front,

gains which Stalin
relations

'Which certainly

then in drawing the conclusion

in the Soviet foreign

uncompromising attitude
lingered

policy,

international

and the delaying

Fainsod arrives

11

climate,

Far Ea.st, tried

1953, they linked
stands

the Austrian

to reason that

could also facilitate

countered

'While the
era still

conclusion:"On

have sought to preserve
for a

1

detente

1

the
the

in their

by the events in the

on the Gerina.n and Austrian

with a new move. In a note on August 4,
question

with the question

possible

progress

in solving

solution

of the Austrian

of Germany. "It

the German problem

treaty.

1116In addition,

15Merle Fainsod, "The Soviet Union Since Stalin,"
Problems fil'..
Communis m (Washington: _United States Information Agency, Vol. 3, No. 2,
1954), p. 10.
16current

and

15

to reopen the negotiations

The Soviets

the seemingly

of the Stalin

at a similar

while pressing

with the free world.

that

were only superficial

tactics

they (the Russians)
achieved,

policy

The Western Powers, encouraged particularly

treaties.

gave

influence.

One is justified

designed

policy.

Molotov was the only man in the new

government who knew anything _about foreign
him great

and one could

Digest .Q1:~ Soviet Press, .Vol. V, No. 35, p. 19.
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th ey still

demanded the withdrawal

Western Powers finally
Austrian

question

diploma.tic

of the "abbreviated

treaty.

agreed to withdraw the disputed

treaty.

continued

correspondence

between the Soviet

It is worth noting
foreign

policy.

a solution

to be one of the main subjects

in this

Russian politicians

of the Austrian

question

ceeded to link the Austrian
Russian attitude
assessment

context

party

of militarism

leadin g Germany into

settlement

treaty

that

The

any optimistic

of the problem.
toward Germany in a speech
11

No disguise

of the Adenauer group which is the

and revanchism

in West Germany, and wich

a new war. 1117 It -was not until

and German questions

points

Yet they pro-

in the Kremlin on August 22, 1953:

can hide the true aspirations

Austrian

at several

with the German settlement.

Malenkov -was very outspoken about his attitude

headquarter

in the Soviet

toward Germany, however, did not justify

given at a dinner

The

of the

the contradiction

was not impossible.

of the chances of an early

The

Union and the Western Allies.

had indicated

question

11

in the spring

the separation

of 1955 that

is
of the

the Austrian

became reality.
On the basis

of the above mentioned exchange of notes,

Union finally

agreed to a four Power conference

international

tens io ns and to discuss

the Soviet

in order to decrease

the German and Austrian

treaties:

Bein g gui ded by the desire to cooperate in t he speedy settle ment
of ur gent international
problems, the Soviet government expresses
its r eadin ess to take part in a meeting of the ministers
of ~oreign
affairs
of the United States, the USSR, England and France. 1

17Pr avda cited
No. 34, pp . 1-2.

in Curr ent Di ges t of the Soviet

18New Worl d Revi ew, December 1953, p. 13.

Pre s s, Vol. V,
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The Berlin

Conference

of the Foreign Ministers proved to be a
·
19
for the Western Powers.
The Western Powers and

gr eat di sappointment
Aust ria were definitely

overoptimistic

with regard

The Russ ians had not given any indication

whatsoever

wil ling t o make concessions

on the Austrian

contr ary, t he events before

the Berlin

with Ger nany, justified

exactly

that

Conference,

assumption.

To the Russians

Russians

came to the Conference was to get disarmament
the Chinese People's
Geneva Conference,

was recorded

Union. Pr avda pointed
made it possible
clarify

by the Soviet

The article

re ached between the United States,
steps

19For further

and German

representation

under way
at the

both ai ms, and the
for the Soviet

the Berlin

Conference

exchange of opinion which helped to
hailed
France,

the fact

that

Great Britain
of disarmament.

attention

to the fact

agr eement was
and the Soviet
Pr avda,
that

the Allies

t.he Geneva Conference which would 'Witness the

details

the

different

talks

press as a success

in the field

furt her more, devoted considerable
had agreed to call

Republic's

Union achieved

to have a valuable

Union to take positive

Austria

The main reason why the

out on February 20, 1954, that

the differences.

the

which was to deal with the problems of

and Korea. The Soviet

Conference

Clearly,

the Austrian

were only of secondary

Indochina

importance.

On

such as linking

t reaties

forthcoming

they would be

Conference with aims quite

from those of the Western Allies.

and to obtain

Conference.

or German questions.

the opposite

Soviet Uni on came to the Berlin

to this

see Chapter III,

p. 28.
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participation

of the Chinese People's

f ollo wed by another

on February

Republic. 20 This article

22, 1954, discussing

was

the importance

of

'

the Chin ese People's

Republic,

and emphasizing

par t ici pati on in negotiations

dealing

arti cle on February

with difficult

21 Izyestia

prob ler .1s had become a necessity.

the fact

that

China's

international

followed

the same line

in an

28, 1954.

The decision to hold the Geneva conference is convincing proof
that th e rol e and importance of the Chinese People's Republic in
in t ernational
life can no longer be ignored. This decision implies
virtual
recognition
of the Chinese People's Republic as a great
po'Wer.22
Very little

attention

was devoted

and German questions.

Pravda stated:

an agreement

questions,

on these

were not taken off the agenda.
stressing

again the connection

in both papers to the Austrian

"The Ministers

'Were unable to reach

but it goes without

saying that

23 A second reference

they

was ma.de to Austria,

11

between the Austrian

and German

settl ements.
t he
the
its
the

The aforementio n ed Western plans for Germany, which intensify
dan ger of a German militarist
revival, · prevented settle ment of
Austrian question. Nonetheless the Soviet government reaffirmed
faith that t he possibility
remains of settling
the question in
very near future.24

On th e basis

of these

articles

th e Sovi ets had absolutely
questi ons at the Berlin

the conclusion

no intention

seems to be justified

of solving

that

the German and Austrian

Conference .

20curren t Digest Qf. the Soviet

Pre s s, Vol. VI, No. 4, P• .3.

21Ibid ., No. 8, p. 29.

22~.,

No. 9, P• 25.

231m.g,., No. 4, p. .3~

24I bid.,

p. 4.
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The Soviet

press now turned its

Geneva Conference.

The United States

attention

was frequently

to conti nue the strug gle in Indochina,
ot he r parts

of Asia. 25 Russian fears
in Indochina

to the forthcoming
attacked

and for planning
that

direc tly

involved

of State

Dulles had asked represent atives

aggression

the United States

were not completely

for helping
in

might get

unfounded.

Secretar<J

in Congress to support

a

r es ol ut i on to permit the Presid ent to use air and naval power in Indochina.

His t heory was that

t o ret rea t t o Hawaii.

actio n . The conference

On

in particular
table

the United States
was only prevented

Great Britain,

was considered

might have
by the

to support

that

the more appropriate

means

dispute. 26

that
April

fell

Western intervention

r ef usal of other Allies,

for settling

if Indochina

25, 1954, the Geneva Conference

opened. Two issues

were

on the agenda: the problem of Korea and the problem of Indochina.
the Korean question
finally

could not be settled

satisfactorily,

an accord -was

The war was ended and three

reached on Indochina.

While

states

were

created--La _os, Cambodia and Vietnam. Vietnam was divided,

the northern

part

part

to remain under Communist dominance and the southern

under Western influence
the Chinese People's
these negotiations.
suc ces s in the Soviet

until

elections

were held.

Republic undoubtedly

played an important

The Geneva accord was hailed
press.

Pravda pointed

The Soviet

at least

out that

to remain
Union and
role

in

as a partial

the Geneva accord

25 Ibi d ., No. 11 , p. 20.
26chalmers M. Roberts, 11The Day We Didn't Go to War, 11 World in
Crisis,
Fred erick H. Hartmann, editor, second edition (New York:
Macmillan Company, 1963), p. 241.
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had created

favorable

unresolved

international

conditions
questions

guaranteein g collective
Already before
her atte ntion
articles

security

security.

27

for all European states.

the Geneva Confer ence the Soviet

t ion and pointing
The Soviet

Union had to turn

to Germany. A whole score of

to Italy.

ratification

but also offered

wer~ used.

opposed to the European
for rearmament of West

German rearmament was depicted

establishing

to prevent

t he EDC.

a draft

to t he EDC. On February

for an all-Euro pean security

and the Chinese People

This was clearly

1

10, 1954,

treaty.

28 The

s Republ ic were to be admitted

an attempt

German rearmament.

Russian opposition

as a

however, not only engage d in strong protests

a counterproposal

submitted

hav e permitted

was strongly

European

The old German-French antagonism was exploited

The Soyiet Union,

obs ervers.

of collective

(EDC), which would have provided

of the treaty

States

to the necessity

Union naturally

Germany. Various techniques

United

such as ending the arms race or

to Europe and in particular

Defense Comm
unity

}1olotov

of other important

can be found in the Sovi et press denouncing German

re militariza

threat

for the settlement

to defeat

the EDC, which would

Molotov more than once expressed

to German remilitariza

t ion.

as

the

In a note on March 31,

1954, the Soviet Union proposed the abandonment of' the EDC, and urged
the United
return

States

was willing

Organization.

11 •••

to join the all- European security
to consider

joining

the North Atlantic

the USSR is prepared

27cur r ent Digest of ~

Sovie t~'

28New York Times, February

system. Russia in

to consider

Treaty

jointly

with the

Vol. VI, No. 24, p. 1.

11, 1954, p. 4.
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governments concerned the participation
112
9 This proposal,

Treaty Organization.
as an attempt
a gainst

Ma.lenkov pointed

Premier

are

in the saddle once more and increasingly,

aggressive

force,

24, 1954, the Soviet
proposing

to discuss

the Fr ench National

a conference

but as a real

Union sent another
of all

threat

to

Assembly rejected

t hei r j oy was shortlived.

officials

European countries,

security.

Republic

as

On August JO, 1954,

the EDC by a vote of 319 to 264. 31
hailed

the rejection

The Western powers innnediately

for the EDC. The extension

r egarded as the best solution.

note to the

and the Chinese People's

European collective

The Sovi et press and Soviet

f o~ a su bstitute

warnings

the Supreme Soviet,

the West German militarists

t oget her with the United States
obs er ve rs,

their

by the West

11
30

European security.

Wester n Allies

••

themselves

act not as a potentially

continued

In a speech before

out that"•

to feel

On July

however, was rejected

to block the EDC. The Russians

German rearmament.

beginning

of the USSR in the North Atlantic

of the EDC. Yet
started

of the Brussels

looking

Pact was

The nine powers at the London conference 32

a gre ed on October 3, 1954, to revise

the Brussels

Pact and to include

Germany and Italy. 33 This conference

was followed

by a nine-power

29New World Review, April
JOibid.,

1954, P• 11.

May 1954, P• 17.

31New Yor k Times, August 31, 1954.
3 2united States, Canada, Great Britain,
Luxembourg, France, Italy and Germany.
33New York Times, October 4, 1954.

Belgium, Netherlands,
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conference

in Paris,

which approved a protocol

creating

the Western

European Union.
The Soviet

Union scored the London and Paris

agreements

and

charged the West with engagin g in aggression.

In a note of November 13,

1954, the Sovi et Union extended an invitation

to all

with whom she had diplomatic
a conference

relations

on European security

think

countries

t hat the Soviet

will

includes

passively

watch tho forme.tion

was issued

European defense

that

organization

would form their

empty threat.
Cooperation
Bulgarian

watching.

the refusal

The meeting

if the Paris
on these

own defense

34 current

Digest

of~

proved that
scheduled

for

agreements,

organization.3

Hungarian People's

Sovi et Press,

to

of the participants
in a

were abandoned. 35
the Communist
6 This was not an

the Treaty of Friendship,

and Mutual Aid between the .Albanian People's
Republic,

bloc which

to participate

agreements

On May 14, 1955, the Warsaw Treaty,

People's

.American

of the Western countries

they were willing

Should the Western Powers insist
countries

of a military

On December 2, 1954, a statement

to the effect

to attend

European

34 The next developments

Union was not passively

the conference.

Apparently,

11

11

November 29, took place despite
attend

conference:

Union and other peace-loving

West German militarists.

the Soviet

and to the United States

in Moscow on November 29. Pravda -wrote

with regard to the European security
leaders

European countries

Republic,

Republic,
German Democratic

Vol. VI, No. 46, p. 45

350n1y the eight Communist countries of Eastern Europe and the
in the conference.
Chinese People's Republic as an, observer participated
3%ckintosh,

.Q.12• cit.,

p. 86.
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Republic,
Soviet

Polish

People's

Soci alis t Republics

Communist counterpart
A brief

Republic,

Rumanian People's

and Czechoslovak

to the North Atlantic

glan ce at developments
was achieved

Reptiblic,

Union of

was concluded,

the

Treaty Organization.37

with regard
in this

Republic,

shows that

no progress

field.

the Soviet

government sent a note to the Austrian

to the Austrian

treaty

On August 12, 1954,
government stating:

The Sovi et government considers, as before, that it is fully
possible -to conclude a st ate tre aty aimed at restoring
a free and
independ ent Austrian state ••••
In accordance with this, the
Soviet government consents to holding a conference of Ambassadors
of the USSR, France, Great Britain and the Unite d States in Vienna,
wi th the participation
of an Austrian representative,
which would
concern itself
with examinin g the remaining unr es olved questions
concerni ng the draft treaty with Austria ••• 38
This note,
question

however, did not lead to any meeting,
was put on the shelf

Once more it
aff airs.

is necessary

the sprin g of 1955.

to turn attention

Toward the end of 1954 and particularly

Malenk ov's position
arose

until

appe ared to be less

over economic policy,

V.ialenkov's fall.

although

and the Austrian

Malenkov had repeatedly

Soviet

at the beginning

and less

there

to internal

secure.

were several

of 1955

The differences
reasons

stre ss ed the importance

for
of the

consumer good indust r y:
The urgent tas k lies in r aising sharply in two or three years the
populati on 's su pply of foodstuffs
and manufactured goods, meat and
meat product s, butter,
sugar, confe ctionery,
textiles,
garments ,
footwear, •••
; in raisi ng considerabl y the supply to the population
of all articles
of general consumption.J~

37~

York Times, May 15, 1955.

J 8current

Diges t of the Sovi et Press,

J9 Pra vda cited

Vol. VI, No. 46, p. 45.

in New World Revi ew, September 1953, p. 6.
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Khrus hch ev, on the other hand, believed
heavy in dus try.

Professor

Dallin's

in the overriding

comment about the fall

importance

of

of Malenkov is:

11

The r ock on which the Malenkov ship went dow was heavy industry

versus

food and consumer goods. u40
On

February 8, 1955, Malenkov resigned,

Mars hal N. A. Bulganin who together
leadership
that

was achieved

Khrushchev had removed Malenk ov

in the negotiations

Although the Soviet

Union was not willing

Germany, for rather

obvious reasons,

on February

8, 1955, that

the Austrian

near future.4 1 The opportunity
government.

Contacts
channels.

invitation

to th e Austrian

further

discussi

an Austrian

The initial

neutral

country

settled

at an Ambassadors'

40nallin,

after

4 1For further details
Chapter IV, pp . 29-34.

question

on

in his speech

might be solved in the

immediately

through traditional

were followed

The invitation

was gladly

by an
to Moscow for
accepted

and

went t o Moscow. In the negotiations

15, it was agreed that

the pattern

QQ• cit.,

Molotov indicated

government to send a delegation

on of the issue.

12 and April

treaty.

to make any concessions

discussions

government delegation

between April

for the Austrian

was not bypassed by the Austrian

were established

diplorr.atic

by

with Khrushchev formed the new top

in Russia . It was only after

progress

and was succeeded

of Switzerland.4

conference

Austria

would be a

2 The final

points

were

in Vienna; and on May 15, 1955, the

p. 221.
on the negot ia t i ons until

May 15, 1955, see

42 Dallin points out that Molotov first wanted a mutual assis tan ce
pact bet ween Austria and the Soviet Union. Upon Austria's
refusal Molotov
agreed to Austria's
neutrality
following the Swiss example.
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f our for ei gn ministers
An

si gned t he Austrian

anal ysi s of t he events

and th e fa ilures

of the Soviet

betwe en 1945 and 1955 brings

The original

oppos i tion to further

s upport in Austria

failed

Communi st Party necessitated

the Russians had to fall

their

back on their

controlled

puppet regime-was lacking.

after

or better,

behind the facade

j ust in t he Eastern

own resources.

plans for Austria.

had authority

of mass

government ,

The essential

Thus the Soviets

Communistcould not pursue

No only did the Russians
but the government established

in the whole of Austria,

and not

zone or Western zones as was the case in Germany. It

was a government which was by no means willing
Soviet

of the Austrian

Communist tactics--the

a Communist puppet regime,

the 1945 elections

the lack of popular

in the Austrian

of legitimacy.

Yet

The rising

Communists to get control

positions

of Russian,

to establish

to become reality.

a change in the original

instrument

fail

some of

aims of adding the Austrian

and miscalculations

of the Austrian

or ganizat i ons and to retain

t heir policies

and furnishes

Communist expansion,

and the blunders

Due to the inability

out t he aims

empire43 had to give way to more modest plans.

even th es e mor e modest aspirations
Western

Treaty.

pol i cy in Austria,

the r ea s ons for th ese failures.
st ate t o the sa tel lite

State

to retreat

because of

th reats.

43In an interview Professor Ulam agreed with this conclusion. He
asse r t ed t hat 11Austr i a too was on the ti me table. 11 He pointed out t hat
St alin was a very cautio us and skillful
politician
in t he field of foreign
poli cy, and was careful not to push t he West too far. This undoubted l y is
one of t he reasons for the change in Soviet policy toward Austria.
Dr. Ada~ B. Ula.m, of Harvard University,
in an ·nterview, April,1965.
Permi ssi on to quote secured.
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In the last

death the Soviet policy
I
had reached a point where positive action was no longer

toward Austria
possible

without

few years

admitting

before

defeat.

Stalin's

As pointed

Chapter VII, Austria

was not the only failure

Thus Stulin

to a policy

resorted

face--maintenance

of the status

The question
after

Stalin

policy

1

out at the beginning
in Soviet

foreign

policy.

which could be pursued without

a loss

Why did the new leadership

and take a more positive

Chapter III has attempted

of

quo.

has often been asked why there

s death.

of

~as no marked change

not discard

approach to the question

the old

of Austria?

to find some answers to , these questions.

answer is not a simple one; various

The

elements have to be taken into

consideration.
First,

one of the most important

element of continuity.
usually

surrounded

The spectacular

by a great

While the policy

ib this

respect

changes in leadership,

that

despite

makers in the Soviet
Russian policy

domestic

follows

the same broad course.

certainly
gradual

does take place in the policy
modification.

and again in 1955 after
statement.

The changes in foreign
Malenkov's

The conciliatory

Chapter VII were indications
but they do not justify

pursued,

moves discussed
of a more

the assumption

that

the

Change

after

Stalin

1

s death

bear out the above
in greater

liberal

11

whether within

but it is a slow,

policy

resignation

is

Union come and go,

general

spheres,

which are

these changes there

sometimes very unexpectedly,
or foreign

is the

deal of mystery in the case of the Soviet

Union, tend to camouflage the fact
continuity.

factors

11

Soviet

a radical

detail
foreign

in
policy,

reorientation

took
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place after

Stalin's

and the attitude
principles

death.

basically

foreign

Second, a closer
shows very clearly

Stalin's

than any other

principles;

difficulties

fact.

of the German settlement
struggle,

of a rearmed Germany?

As long as Russia's
the Korean and Indochinese
be expected.

main interest
questions,

was maintained.

Stalin's

death

problems confronting

event which has no
more

How could anyone understand
I

without

the Sovie t fears

the

but

and German treaties,

without

in the German rearmament,

the

It wohi d be a great mistake

The Austrian

bear out this

of the East--West

after

as an isolated

dangers inherent

hardly

· continuity

of the various

politics.

of a question

issue,

show that

were taken over into

look at the developments

with other problems.

and Germany

one might say "liberalized,"

Union in international

connection

under Stalin

the interdependence

to see the solution

context

policy

they were modified,

they w~re still

the Soviet

on Austria

toward the West in general , in fact,

governing

Malenkov era;

The Russian position

seeing

it in the proper

realizing

the potential

or without

taking

was focused
positive

account

on a settlement

steps

A Russia which was preoccupied

the

of

of

in Europe could
with avoiding

German

rearmament through the European Defense Community or throug h other means
could hardly
question.
K

Vital
last

and foreign
Stalin's

be expected to seriously
interests
important
policy.

of a nation
point,

seek a solution
naturally

of the Austrian

have priority.

is the close connection

Instability

within

death and c.ontinuing

to exist

the country,

between domestic

manifest

after

due to the power struggle

between

Khrush chev and Malenkov, was not conducive to making major concessions

in
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f orei gn policy,

especially

cer tai n controversial
independent

Austria

unable and. unwilling
Why then,
cessions
will

position.

concession

to make at that

i.ras it possible
a free

in the final

involved

No one will doubt that

would have entailed

and to res tore

be explored

if these

concessions

retreat

from a

a free and

which Malenkov was

time.

for Khrushchev to make these conand independent

chapter.

Austria7

This question

VIII
WHYTHESOVIETUNIONSIGNEDTHE
AUSTRIANTREATYIN 1955
Up to this
the negotiations
various

point

the study has dealt

with the historical

and the cumbersome and exhausting

clauses

of the treaty.

The readers

attention

solution

of the Austrian

question

was possible,

between the speech and the news dispatches
free again.

policy

The discussion

important

of Soviet

over the

that

a

and to the developments

announcing that

foreign

of

has been drawn to

speech on February 8, 1955, in which he indicated

Molotov's

certain

discussions

facts

policy

changes which were responsible

after

Austria
Stalin

was
revealed

for the new positive

toward Austria.
While the first

step of finding

the modifications

and interpreting

the second step of analysing

these facts

difficult.

Involved

evaluation

is always in some measure subjective.

before and after
to verify

is an evaluation

a certain

action

and substantiate

in mind that,

particularly

Union, the material
disclosed

is limited;

This does not preclude

certain

policy

an analysis

decisions;

has to remain.

a meaningful

it only points

have been used here
But one has to bear

decisions

of the Soviet

in many cases sources

the event took place,

at all.

and an

No doubt developments

presented.

to policy

easy,

is much more

actions,

can be and in fact

with regard

available

a long time after

of certain

the hypotheses

is fairly

are only

if they are disclosed

and valuable

out the limits

analysis
within

of

which such
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A discussion
from Austria

of the motives or reasons

encounters

precisely

or Khrushchev did not indicate
even if their
lies

statements

for Russian -withdrawal

the above mentioned limitations.

the real

reason for ' the Russian move, and

are examined in this

context,

great

what is propaganda and what indicates

in deciding

behind a certain

policy.

to find an explanation

Molotov

For these reasons

other

the real

sources
I

for the Russian willingness

difficulty
motives

must be explored

to sign the State

Treaty.
The foreign
factors.

First,

international

policy

of a country

the foreign
situation

policy

extent,

is obvious that

I

time.

to international

of the ans-wer to the question

every foreign

policy

events. 1 It would be utterly

domestic
does exist
foreign

Secondly,

by itself

policy

interdependence.
Stalin,"

and is not subject

after

Stalin's

is closely

signed

prevailing

at

connected with

wrong to assume that

You cannot have a Stalinist

Thus it

why the Russians

situation

to domestic

of

situation

events.

foreign

events.

death is an excellentexample

11

commented Professor

policy

to shape a given international

the Treaty has to be found in the international
that

by t-wo

of any country depends on the

it is also a reaction

part

determined

at a given time. Although the foreign

a superpo-wer such as Russia helps

to a large

is basically

f 1oreign

policy

policy

The change in
of this
'Without

Ulam. 2

The principles
of the Communist Party on questions of foreign
part of the program, strategy and tactics
of the
policy are an integral
Party."
Kommunist, No. 7 cited in Current Digest of th e Soviet Press,
1
Vol. V, No . 20. p. J.
111

April,

2Dr. Adam Bruno Ulam, of Harvard University,
1965 . Permission to quote secured.

in an interview,
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Thus domestic
field

events might provide

of international

politics,

the cause for a / certain

\.Jhich otherwise

if one looked only into the international
evidence

that

repercussions

in international

politics,

above questi on, therefore,
field,

leaving

and foreign

domestic

be attributed
policy
final

certain

to one single

The process

advantages

prevail

one other premise has to

conditions

onal politics

all

contribute

consists

will decide against

the situatio

without

the action.

then t he nation

to the

in the careful

of a given step.

own decision

can

the aims of the

to the national J interest

over the disadvantages,

This was precisely

between

government.

interest,

and disadvantages

to measure

The answer to the

in internati

National

is able to make its

then the nation

proper

of making a decision

would be contrary

and if the nation
pressure,

factor.

have their

in the international

on Soviet

decision

international

of the advantages
action

to an expert

Hardly any policy

decision.

policy.

of the relationship

to the analysis

makers and existing

balancing

step.

evaluation

policy

Before proceeding
be established.

had and still

must be found primarily

the detailed

There is ample

yet it is difficult

the rE@-l impa ct they have on Russian foreign

in the

would be hard to explain

situation.

changes in the Soviet leadership

action

If a

of a nation,
outside
If the
will

take the

n in which Russia found herself

in

the spri ng of 1955.
Russia's

biggest

her re a ch. Despite
l ost the battle
London and Paris
provided

headache in Europe, Western Germany, was beyond

a year-long

against

war (propaganda war to be sure),

Western determination

Agreements establishing

for German rearmament.

Russia

to rearm Germany. The

the Western European Union

This inclusion

of West Germany into the
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West . n defense

system called

and these

were taken on May 14, 1955, when the Warsaw Treaty

steps

Organiz ation

for similar

camps 'With a few exceptions;

The East ern part

of Austria

was surrounded

cou.Dtrie s, namely Czechoslovakia,
powers were situated
country,

Soviet att ention.For
disar mament talks
which the Soviet

conference

in April 1955 was certainly

protection
African

of fact,

cooperation,

the conference
world.4

Switzerland,

in the west.

on for quite

toward the underdeveloped

for the Soviet

and neutralist

boundaries.

Union seemed to be very interested.3

policy

success

while NATO

which required

the pending summit conference

which had been carried

As a matter

was one of them.

There were many other developments
instance

divided

was not the only area in which the Soviet

new Soviet

great

countries,

by Communist satellite

and northern

completed the picture

Union was interested.

Austria

Hungary and Yugoslavia,

at the southern

But the European theater

Russians.

by the satellite

was formed in Warsaw. Thus Europe was more or less

int o two military

a neutral

steps

this

conference

a while,

and in

In the light

countries,

of great

or the

of the

the Bandung

importance

for the

has been regarded

as a

Union, since it was a symbol of Communist
and brought the Soviet

took place,

The desirability

a little

of these closer

Union, under whose

closer

to the Asian and

contacts

is obvious in

Jo n May 10, 1955, the USSR repres entative Y. A. Malik submitted a
Proposal of t he Soviet Government on International
Control of Armaments,
Reduction and Pr ohibit ion of Atomic Weapons to the Subcommittee of the
UN Disarmament Commission.

J.B.

4David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After
Lippincott Company, 1961), p. 302.

Stalin

(New York:
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view of a new trend
describes

in the Soviet

it as follows:

the underdeveloped

one time heavily
The Soviet
a three
provided

attacked

by the Soviet

year Soviet-Burmese

only be interpreted
explored
On

trade

India,

as a shift

task,

friend.

in July 1955,
The Soviets

interest

All these

steps

can

to a new and so far

out this

newly

very

tensions

was

in Russia was not

Bloc showed a number of independent

checked, might possibly

of the Bloc. Events such as the Polish

upris in g in the Eastern

was still

in international

of his position

The Soviet

t r ends whic h, if not carefully

power position

In order to carry

a reduction

Yet consolidation

Khrushchev ' s only concern.

lead to revolt
strike

and

or the

zone of Germany could not be disregarded.

Austria

one of these major or minor problems to disturb

mind.

What were the reasons
Austria?

at

area.

and dangerous

Khrushc hev's

mills;

agreement was concluded.

of Soviet

delicate

another

India,

now became Russia's
steel

in

once

11

Burma and Afghanistan.

and needed consolidation.

di :-~.nteg r ation

a 'grand offensive'

with arms. In November and December 1955, Bulganin

acquired

was just

press,

the domesti c scene Khrushchev's

very desirable.

Dallin

was suddenly accepted.

Union promised her aid in building

Afghanistan

Professor

5 Neutralism,

of Asia and Africa.

form of capitalism,

and Khrushchev visited

little

policy.

"Khrushchev was planning

countries

re gard ed as another

foreign

for Khrushchev's

decision

In order to find an answer, the Austrian

5I bid ., p. 279.

t o withdraw from

question

must be
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projected

against

developments.
Soviet

l•

In the course of this

decision

Austria

the above menti oned domestic
stu dy eight

Austria.

concession

advantages

there

position

planned.

The differences

in bi lateral
that

talks

of t he Western

was a gain in prestige,

the

Russia's

move was
treaty

were

and the Soviet Union. It was

were removed without

the active
to the

Tre a ty. Since Russia's

but was initiated

any loss

of prestige

step was not a

by the Soviet
at all.

since Russia could claim credit

On the

Union her~
cont ra ry, it

for getting

the

s under way.

Secondly,

Austria

occu pa tion pattern

evacuate

Union

Powers. Thus Russia was able to point

action,

sh e did not suffer

troops

a

ve and to claim the l i on's share in the successful

reactio ~ to a Western

French,

But in Austria

with regar d to the state

between Austria

the major difficulties

initiati

negotiation

in Europe.

of view of prestige,

conclu sion of the Aust rian State

se~f,

represented

of a i.rl.thdrawal by far outweighed the advanta ges of staying

par ticipation
Soviet

did not lose very much

in so far as it is the only case where the Soviet

Looked at from the point

settled

really

True enough, the Russian withdrawal

re trea ted from an established

carefully

for this

Was llQ. Loss for th e Russians

in leaving

there.

major reasons

have sug gested themselves.

All t hing s consi d ered, _the Russians

real

and international

American

was no loss militarily.

of Austria,
and British

from Austria,
a much larger

With regard

by far the l argest
troops.

the . Soviet

By agreeing

Union forced

to the

area was occupied by
to withdraw Russian

t he Western Powers to

area than her own. The Russians

had to retreat

81

only into Hungary which left

them virtually

the Western troops had to retreat
very fact
stated
it too,

much further.

in his speech before the Central

that

although

at the gates

Khrushchev pointed

to this

Committee in July 1955, -whenhe

Russia had to give up some bases,

and by making Austri a a neutral

of Vienna, wile

country

the West had to do

the military

potential

of

the enemy was not enhanced.6
Thirdly,

Austria

-was no real

year occupation

the Russians

In 1955 Austria

virtually

as the clauses
good bargain

economic loss.

had exploited

by granting

State

Austria

Union did not lose anything

Austrians

of the Austrian

her independence.

ideology.

his def ense of the Austrian

population.
solution

the Centr al Committee by pointing
Austria

was socialist;

neutralizing

6

.QI?.•

Fourthly,

the Soviet

The Austrian

had failed

completely
and defeats

to the rejection

of

Again Khrushchev used this

fact

at the above mentioned session

out that

thus the socialist

£.li., p. 228.

7see Chapter VI for further

forces

testimony

the country.

Dallin,

Russia made a very

The numerous failures

Communists are ·a vivid

Communismby the Austrian

Treaty from the Russians,

in the ideolo gica l field.

to their

details.

7

as much as possible.

Treaty . reveal.

Connnunist Party and the Russian occupation
to attract

Austria

had to buy her State

in the Austrian

Throughout the ten-

not even the Eastern
camp did not suffer

in
of

zone of
a loss

by

82

6·

Aust ria~~

Propag anda Victory

As already

indicated

took the initiative

under the previous

in opening the final

not only took _the initiative,
the negotiations

fQ;t th e Soviet

Union

heading,

Great Britain

of having to ratify

for years were suddenly solved within

a matter

in peaceful

allege

that

Austrian

table.

of the ne gotiations

On the

and show that
international

As the New Worl d Review in its

doubt about the fact

f a ct that

that

it was primarily

Soviet

only the Soviet

and they could stress

opposition

aspect

it was the "notable

the fact

that

naturally

118There is no

to their

the real

8New World Revi ew, June 1953, p. 3.

lies

which had frustrated

of the picture

could allude

pointed

Union was in the position

The explanation

Soviet

Yet this

politicians

that

press--

the conclusion

June 1953 issue

had made agreement possible.

her independence.

to conclude a treaty.
omitted;

conceded in the press

of the USSR that

grant Austria

of the

slogan which appeared many times in the Soviet

out, it had been generally
concessions

problems

in a solution

and t ha t it was only the Western Powers which had prevented
treaty.

she

other hand, she could

the Soviet Union was always interested

question--a

of a state

the

Union, on the one

intentions

coexist ence, and that

could be solved at the conference

the Moscow

of months without

of the Western Powers. Thus the Soviet

hand, could proudly point to her peaceful

and France in

(more or less)

Mem
orandum. Problems which had held up the conclusion

believed

She

but she excluded the Western Powers from

t he rat her awkward position

really

Union

stage of the negoti ations.

and put the United States,

participation

the Soviet

in the
efforts

was very skillfully

peaceful

efforts

to

intentions,

and concessions

of
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the Soviet
Aust rian

].

Union led to Austria's

i ndependence and freedom. No doubt,

settle ment is probably

A Settlement

the best example of peaceful

of the Austrian

t he

coexistence.

Question .Would Decre ase Intern ational

Tension
It has been pointed
in a decrease
pea ceful

out before

of international

coexistence

tensions.

change in leadership

in 1953, a gradual

leade~ , was determined

State

~hroat.

further.

foreign

policy.

Committee

era. His policy

Eisenhower had stated

deeds and not mere words that
attention

to that

speech. EisenhOi~er's

was that

policy

The Soviet

international

tensions,

their

for peace,

efforts

series

demonstrates

on the
coexistence.

remarks were reported

in Pravda

conciliatory

moves

New World Review joined

of dee ds designed
the sincerity

and point up the necessity

it was

press had devoted much

Union to the demand for deeds.
This continuing

to

16, 1953, that

of the Soviet

11

Khrushchev

of peaceful

and the two papers more than once linked

trend.

the

in July 1955, indicated

and Izvestia,

general

after

The opposition

in a speech on April
counted.

as the new

The events

Khrushchev was not willin g to base his foreign
of the Stalin

Going back to the

time on. Khrushchev,

tensions

of the Central

of

where not

Treaty would seem to show that

a new course in Soviet

Molotov at the session

President

new policy

improve ment of the rel ati ons

from that

to decrease

si n' i ng of the Austrian

principles

Union was interested

Khrushchev's

to cut everybody else's

between East and West occurred

that

the Soviet

could be pursued only in an atmosphere

everybody was determined

initiated

that

the

to relieve

of the Soviet
of an early

Union in
top level
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meetin g . 119The Austrian
opportunity
President

tr eaty question

to prove Russia's
Eisenhower.

offered

good intentions

Khrushchev a unique
by a deed, as demanded by

I zves tia. wrote on March 27, 1955: "After all,
.

.Am
erican

officials

question

the 'touchstone'

The timing
conference,
relations

themselves

of this

have frequently

for solving

action

.

the Austrian
problems. 1110

international

which had been planned for quite

shortly

before

a long time.

the summit

The good

between Eisenhower and Marshal Georgi Zhukov were stress ed.
11
We spoke as soldiers

for -war between our countries.

1111Shortly

too k pl ace, New Worl d Revi ew reported
Treaty provided

I t i s obvious,
international

a hopeful

therefore,

initiated

before

that

the summit conference

the conclusion

the Russians

of the Austrian

were interested

conference. 12

in decreasin g

tensions.
reasons

might be added another

campaign in the underdeveloped

the Russian attitude
hand wit h t he doctrine

countries.

toward the countries
of peaceful

depe nded to a large

t he Soviet

and saw no grounds

background for the forthcoming

that

To the above stated

policy

urgent

was good; it occurred

Zhukov said in an interview:

State

called

extent

Union was honestly

ne-wly

This marked change in

in Asia and Africa went hand in

coexistence.
on the belief

striving

one: their

for peace.

The success
of these

of the new

countries

The conclusion

that
of an

9New World Revie w, July 1953, p. 24.
10 current

Diges t of the Sovi et Press , Vol. VII, No. 13, p. 26.

11New Wo:rld Revi ew, :tliarch 1955, p. 9.
12J bid ., June 1955, p. 8.
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Austrian

treaty

was a dramatic

Russia's

emphasis on peaceful

decr ea se in t ernational

enough proof of these
coexistence

tensions,

peaceful

and her actual

together

intentions.

efforts

to

with anti-imperialistic

. s eemed to be a very good approach to winning the support

slogans,

of some of the

Afro- Asian countries.
~.

The New Sovi et Attit ude Toward Neutr al ity~~

Neutral

Austr i a

Possi ble
As Professor
neutral

nations

camps--the

Dallin

or parties.

capitalist

attitude

after

1113 After

that

realistically.

there

group of countries

The Soviet
a neutral

cit.,

countries

p. 290.

countries

the Soviet

which belonged

camp, but which

Union now looked at the situation
or non-aligned

camp, but, more important,

.£2•

in

81).

camp nor the capitalist

position.

camp. Neutral

13Dallin,

trend appears

equated with capitalism:

was a third

It was true,

for the socialist

(seep.

was no longer

to the socialist

occupied a central

underwent

turn into a pro-neutralist

toward the non-aligned

Burma or Afghanistan

Thus neutrality

capi talist

death the policy

of April 1955, which took place under Soviet

and in the new attitude

Union realized

into two

was no room for

Khrushchev won power. Evidence of this

such as India,

neither

there

Stalin's

and took a decisive

t he Br....ndungConference
sponsorship,

the world was divided

and the socialist--and

modification

for

11

For Stalin,

anyone between the fronts.
gradual

There was no place in Stalinism

observes:

country was no gain

it was not a gain for the

were at least

an in direct

asset.

A
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realistic

appraisal

of the Austrian

and perhaps desirable

(see below).

situation

It was better

Austria

than to hand over the western part

neutral

Austria

relation

was actually

i• !

Neutr al Austria

Austria

to the ca pital ist
for Khrushchev.

Asian and African
prestige

was that

entr y i nto aggressive

possible

to have a unified,

carnp. A

this

step

in these areas.

comment,

an advantage

Trea ty Organiz at ion

of an independent,

"The agreement reached in Moscow precludes

militar-J

alliances

and coalitio

ns like

lit tl e Austria

in the light

of international

suddenly achieved

a rather

The Par i s and London Agreements created

which was to include

and Austria.

of central

Austria

possibility.

together

two NATOpowers.

of new developments,

a member of NATO, the inclusion

of Western Austria

was by no means a utopian

especially

14Pravda cited
No. 16, p. 24.

idea,

in Current Digest

WEU,linked
of

with Switzerland,
The inclusion

of

from the Western

in Western newspapers had in fact

In the light

position.

Europe with the exception

in NATOwould have been very desirable

poL"'J.tof view. Articles
this

strategic

the Western European Union (WEU)

Western Austria,

sepa r ated West Germany from Italy,
Western

important

location

in 1954 and 1955,

two new members, West Germany and Italy.

to l1IATO
, covered almost all
Swltze rland

developments

Austria's

the North

14 In view of its
Atlan t ic Bloc and the Western European Union . 11
and looked at

neutral

Seen in

countries,

Was s · Loss to the North Atla ntic

According to a press
neutral

an advantage

to the other neutral

could only enhance Russia's

made neutrality

oft en discussed

with Germany becoming
into this

if the stalemate

of the Soviet

organization
in the

Pres s , Vol. VII,

87

negotiations

on an Austrian

treaty

continued

for much longer.

in the Kremlin appeared to be very much aware of this
stated

fact.

The leaders
Izvestia

in March 1955:

the answer to this question15 is found in the alarm
expre ss ed by the British newspaper Daily Express over the fact that
the opportunity to settle the Austrian problem threatens to end the
Western powers occupation of Austria. This is what these powers fear,
this is what they don't want. 11
11•••
th e press reports that the Western powers ass;ign Austria
the role of 1Alpine stronghold 1 of the Atlantic bloc. 1116
11 •••

There was only one way of preventing
t he NATOalliance:
that

the Russians

before,

this

to make Austria

some bases,

sacrifice;

advant age. It was far more important

that

making Austria

neutral,

increased . The seeming concession
important
Q•

Austria,

gain for the Soviet

this

together

brings

potential

in

It is true
pointed

out

was a great
with

land and air

in Germany and Italy.

toward Austria

the military

but as already

interrupting

corrmunica t ions betwe en the NATOforces
of his policy

country.

on the c0ntr~·y,

Switzer lan d, cut the NATO bloc in half,

j~sti f ica tion

participation

a free and neutral

had to sac ri fice

was not a real

Austria's

out that

Khrush chev 1 s
very point.

By

of the enemy was not

of the Russians

turned

out to be an

Union.

The Warsaw Treaty Made Withdrawal llQ.ill Austria

Possible

It has been brought out more than once tha t one of the main
justifi

cations

for the stationing

Ruma.nia was the necessity

of maintaining

15 The article
dealt
the new Soviet move.
16

of Soviet

Curre nt Digest .Qf

with the rather
~

Soviet

troops

in Hungary and

supply and communication lines

mixed reaction

of the West to

Press , Vol. VII, No. 11, p. 27.
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for the Rus sian occupation

in Austria . In fact,

forces

with Hungary and Rumania explicitly
Union . The developments

in the satellite

si gnin g of the Austria. ~ State
pre senc•' of Sovie t troops

her troops

fro m Austria,

withdrawal

of troops

effects

pact,

the Soviet

could withdraw

of Soviet

As long as there

t his problem.

and Rumanian peace treaties,
treaty

and withdraw

troops

the
in 1956

might have had

Organization,

the counter-

Under the terms of the Warsaw ·
troops

of the Soviet

to sign the Austrian
her forces

was no

of view of the Russians.

Union could station

the fun ct ion of a police

7.

empire.

the Warsaw Treaty

Since one of t he main objectives
it was possible

the

such a move would have necessitated

a withdrawal

to NATO, eliminated

Treaty,

without

Russia would not have been

to sign an Austrian

from the point

Tne new defense
part

since

that

the

also from Hungary and Rumania. 17 The events

in Hungary proved that
disastrous

countries,

to the Soviet
and after

indicated

in the Hungarian

be expected

right

bloc before

her satellite

for the guarantees

Russia could hardly

that

Treaty clearly

in these

a · le -r,o bui l d and maintain
substitute

granted

the peace treaties

State

in the countries

concerned.

Union was thus achieved,

Treaty . Now the Soviet

into Hungary, and could thus still
power in the satellite

An Indenende nt Neutr al Austr ia would be~

Union

exercise

countries.
Safeg uard Agai ns t~

New

AnschJu ss
From sta tements by Soviet

17 Tnese implications

of
give some explanation for
fe_ence in 1954, which provided
on the ccnt i nued station ing of

.c::..-,:1
t

officials

as well as press

releases

in

a wit hdrawal of Soviet troo ps fro m Austria
the Soviet proposal at the Berlin Confor a signing of the treaty,
but insisted
troops in Austria.
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Pr avda and I zve stia , the possibility
concern to the Russians

of a future

than generally

believed.

Anschl uss was not a theme brought up just
through out the ten years
friendly

rel ations

of occupation.

between Austria

the All ie d Council for Austria,
Austria,

issue,

The fear of a new

around 1955, but was mentioned

Whenever there

was a sign of more

and Germany, Russia raised

and Prav da and Izv estia

acc using her of planning

articl es and editorials

Anschluss was of greater

protests

started

in

to attack

a new union with Germany. Numerous

warned Austria

against

siding

sin ce it might lead to a new Anschluss.

with Germany on any

Any step toward closer

econ omic ti es with Germany brought dow.n on Aust ria a flood of warnings
snd acc~sa ti ons. It is beyond the scope of this
reasons
fears

and origins

of these

and to take them into

fears.

thesis

to look into the

It is enough to be aware of these

consideration

when discussing

the Austrian

solution.
Pravda commented that

a treaty

with Austria

was possible

agreement is concluded on measures to make impossible
Anschluss with Germany. 1118At another
agreed that
real

basis

inclusion

point

for saying that

it might not become urgent

of Western Austria

to be at le as t a distant
sooner or later

very thing the Russians

18Dallin,

.Ql2.•

today,

"Even if one
is there

any

tomorrow? 111
9 The

in the Western European Union, whi ch seemed

possibility

in a closer

a new Austrian

Pravda stated:

the danger of an Anschluss is not urgent

11
if an

alliance

at that

time, might have resulted

between Austria

had opposed for so many years.

and Germany, the
Thus an Austrian

cit ., p. 255.

19curr ent Digest of the Soviet

Press,

Vol. VII, No. 11, p. 27.
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tr ea ty re-establis

hing a free

Russian aims in this
an express

and neutral

respect,

prohibition

particularly

against

I t is impossible

country

since the treaty

any future

to determine

could only further

Anschluss.

how much of this

Anschluss was genuine concern and how much was plain
however, reasonable
Soviet decision

a.

to assume that

was to include

opposition

to a new

propaganda.

It seems,

it was one of the major factors

in the

to ·sign · the treaty.

Pressi ng Domesti c Proble ms~

Improved Relations

wit h the West

More Desirable
Last but not least
which certainly
Austrian

had their

State

Treaty.

the power struggle
proble ms created
leadership

there were problems within

the Communist camp

bearing

with regard

Figuring

within

prominently

the Soviet

about which there

is usually

Cornmi
ttee

of the Soviet

reveal

throne,

of certain

this

process

Union several

problems had
had to be

at work. At the meeting of the Central
views met with unani mous disapproval.

it was very shaky. This became clear

especially

Khrushchev,

at times,

in the years

of the anti-Khrus hchev party,

brought about his downfall.

struggle,

between Molotov and the

however, was by no means secure;

1957 with the formation

Any chan ge in

'When Khrush chev and

personalities

The growing differences

in July 1955, Molotov's

Khrushchev's

countries.

scant information.

.and the influence

reduced or eliminated.
new le adership

Union, and on the ot her hand, the

a great deal of behind-the-scenes

Bulganin became the new leaders

to the

here were, on the one hand,

by events in the satellite

in Russia involves

to be settled,

upon the decisions

obviously,

in fact,

1956 and

which almost

was very much

91
i LJtere s te d in maintaining

his newly acquired

Sovie t Union . This certainly
avoiding
ship.

major risks

called

position

of the

foreign

policy,

for a very skillful

and not exposing any weaknesses

It was much more desirable

as leader

of the new leader-

to come to some kind of agree ment with

the West in order to avoid being tied

down with external

relaxation

enabled Khrushchev to face the

in the international

field

domestic problems with undivided
Internal

Russian affairs,

already

repercussions

however, were not the only Communist

began to show signs
Germany were early
upr isin g in fall

of unrest.

of relaxation
bloc.

course of Yugoslavia,
The strikes

indications.

other satellites

of 1953 in Poland and Eastern

This trend finally

both in Russia herself

in international

t he best opportunity

tensions

to demonstrate

Unio n, th e Russians were willing
2.c,,ion in the international

field

had led to

Aside from the

led to the Hungarian

1956, which bad to be crushed by brutal

All t he se events,
made a red uction

The policy

in the satellite

well known independent

A

attention.

probl ems Khrushchev had to cope with.
some undesirable

issues.

and in the satellites

desirable.

the peaceful

force.

Since Austria

intentions

to sign the Treaty.

offered

of the Soviet

Thus conciliatory

gave Russia the latitude

to deal w:i.th

the inte r na l problems of the Communist bloc more efficiently.
It seems appropriate

to discuss

motiv ation which is sometimes attributed
been maintained
Austrian

State

that

one of the reasons

in this

context

one other

to the Russians . It has often
why the Soviet

Union signed the

Treaty was to show Germany the way to achieve

unification.

Taking into

consi deratio n the size and geographi cal positio n as well as

the history

of Germany, it

seems highly

unlikely

that

the Soviet

Union

9.2
was seriously

trying

to find the solution

in a neutral

Germany. The

proble ms raised

by a neutral

would guarantee

Germany's neutrality?

Who would be able to stop a free

and independent

Germany from deciding

to rearm again? The nature

Germany's economy requires
to lead to strong
trading

partners

likely

ties

a large

amount of exports

with some of the trading

would close

a violation

economic ties

of the status

even with re gard to Austria

today,

of
bound

If one of the

and this

with this

of neutrality?

Who

and imports,

partners.

happened to be the United States,

be the case,

constitute

Germany would have been very great.

would most

capitalist

nation

These problems exist

which is a fairly

small country

compared to Germany. In the case of Germa.ny such problems would be
magnified

many times and would cause continuous

friction

between the East

and the West .
Aside from these

implications

of neutrality,

West Germany had just

become a member of the West ern European Union, and a realistic
leader

coul d have hardly

position.

Molotov,

in fact,

could not be the solution.
issue

Germany to give up that

clearly

solution).
a neutral

that

It would be a great
basis

Gc:rr:::any, but they suffice

_sm. cit.,

p. 230.

l ong-fou ght for

a neutral

blunder,

Germany

if the German

(he was referring

1120These were not the only reasons

Germany would have been unacceptable

.20Dallin,

indicated

11

were to be solved on a similar

Austrian
against

expected

Soviet

to the

which militate

to make it clear

that

a neutral

both to the East and the West •

CONCLUSION
If any major conclusion
that

a policy

decision

to one single

emerges from the preceding

in the international

factor.

Any policy

hand, on an interaction

field

decision

pages it is

cannot be attributed

seems to depend,

between international

and domestic

and on the othe r hand, on the power constell at ion within
realm.

Domestic events may make for a more conciliatory

international
als o after

field,

as was the case after

international

a situation

prevailing

chara cterist

ic of foreign

develo pments taking

instability

in the last
policy

place

same t i me. Action

stands

r eac t ion is t he response
~ore concre te terms,
i 0 is ne cessary
whether a certain

This leads

will

at all

and reaction

environment.

it

be advantageous
process

in the

that

any

at the

To put it

situation
is,

and determine

whether the implications

is vital,
any clear

for the

and in many cases
decision

is dif ficult.

the aims of the leadership

the foreign

in

action,

or disadvantageous

international

tim es. Thus, although

The ot her

indicated,

wishes to take a certain

are so numerous that

of action

and deadlock,

for the ethos of the leaders;

and if

conclusion

however, may

reign.

As previously

at the international

is feasible

to the further

t h e possibilities

coincide

elite

in the

to other international

will _ be action

con cerne d . This evaluation

the factor s involved

time.

to the international

or r esu lt s of th is action
country

of Stalin's

relation

for the motives,

if a ruling

action

policy

or lead to stalemate

is its

politics

to look first

the international

death in 1953 and

Stalin's

few years

at a certain

de cisio n in international

developments,

in 1955. Domestic events,

¥..alenkov 1 s resignation

also increase

on the one

theater

policy

do not fully

of · a country

and
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will

show a high degree of conti nuity,

there

cr eate the impres sion that

they do not quite

policy

But a closer

of a given country.

decision

will

almost always reveal

between the de cision

that

and the general

are many decisions
fit

analysis
there

line

into

which

the general

line

of the specific

is no real

of policy.

of

policy

contr adicti on

The contradictio

n

might only be superficial.
Austria
Aust rian

solution,

Lenin's
higher

is an exce llent

exampl e . Khrushche v, in commenting on the

said himself

strategy

that

was to "take temporary losses

gains . 1121 This proves that,

Austria

one of the basic

although

seemed to be a contra di ction

can best be regarded

in a strug gl e f or

the Russian withdrawal

to the general

pages to point

aims . Some aims were of a short- term nature,
deali ng ~~th problems within

out some of these

i mpli cations,

bloc,

which was desirable
such as preventing

relations

toward neut ral countries,
between the Soviet

highe r

su ch as more f r eed om in
or the

at that

Austria's

in the North Atlanti c Treaty Organizatio n, or the demonstration
attitude

from

of policy, 22 it

line

Russia a..~d the Communist

in int ernati onal tensions

aims had long-term

entailed

of

as a tempor ary l oss for highe r gains . The atte mpt

has been made in the preceding

decrease

principles

time . Other
membership
of a new

which had a gr eat impact on the

Union and the underdeveloped

countries

in

Asia and Africa .

22 ! 1The t r eaty was significant
because it marked the first
vo L;;,-.:,:-~y post - war withdrawa l by the Soviet leaders from an est ablished
pos __,,ion

i n the

c ent er

of Eur op e.

11

Alvin

Z. Rubinstein

(ed.),

The Fo r eign

Polic y of the .Sovi et Unior1 (New Yor k ; Random House, 1960 ) , p . 283.
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It seems that
carefully

balanced

finally
Soviet

arrived

in the ca se of Austria

the Russian policy

the pros and cons of withdrawal

at the conclusion

that

Union to withdraw from Austria.

Russia would have preferred

a solution

makers

from Austria

and

it was more advantageous

for the

There are some indications

that

which did not entail

her

withdrawal

from Austria . If the Soviet

Union, however, was really

interested

in some of the above stated

higher

the withdrawal
important

from Austria

to recall

World War the Soviet

that

could only be advantageous.

for the first

It is,

As to the economic concessions,

out that Austria

furthermore,

time since the end of the Second

Union was able to withdraw her troops

due to the Warsaw Treaty.
been pointed

aims, as she see med to be,

had to pay a very high price

from Austria,
it has already
for her

freedom.
One can, therefore,
independence

arrive

was, from the Russian point

or most profitable

one. The correlation

on the one hand , and the domestic
ot her hand, tipped
Austr ia,

at the conc lusi on that

the scales

and the Iron Curtain

Austr o-Hungar ian border.

the Austrian

of view, the most advantageous
between the aims of the leaders

and international

in favor af a free,

developments

on the

indep endent and neutral

went down not at the Enns, but at the
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APPENDIXA
1
SOVIET- AUSTRIAN COMMUNIQUE

MOSCOW,APRIL 15, 1955
From April 12, 1955, until April 15, 1955, discussions
were held
in Noscow between an Aust ri an Gover_nment Delegati on headed by Chancell or
Jul ius Raab and Vice - Chancellor Dr. Adolf Schaerf and a Soviet Del egation
headed by the Deputy Chair man of the Counc il of Mini sters for Foreign
A_fai r s, V. M. Molotov, and t he Deputy Chairman of t he Council of Minister,
A. I. Vrikoyan, which were carrie d out in a fri endl y sp irit.
As a res ul t of dis cussions by both sides the State Government of
the Soviet Union as well as t he Government of 'the Republic of Austria
conside r as desi rabl e the earliest conclusion of a St ate Treaty on the
establishi~ent
of an inde pendent and de mocratic Austria which should
serve t he na tional i nte r ests of peace in Europe.
The Austri an Dele gation gave assurances that t he Austrian Republi c,
in t he spi rit of the declaration
made at the Berlin Conferenc e in 1954,
intends not to join any military
al li an ces or permit military
bases on
her te r r itory and will pursue a policy of i ndepen dence in re gard to all
st ates whic h should insure the observa..i.1ce of this declaration.
Exodus This Year Agreed
The Soviet si de expressed its agreement that the occu pa ~io n forces
of the f our powers be withdraim f ro m Aust ria upon t he entering into force
of the Stat e Treaty a.~d in any case not later th an December 31, 1955.
Ta~~
ing i nto consideration
t he declaration
of the Unit ed States,
Britain and France made public on Apri l 5, of this year to t he effect tha t
t hey ar e striving to ach i eve t he earliest
conc lu sio n of an Austrian St ate
Trea t y, the Soviet Unio n and Austria expres s the hope that at t he pre s ent
time the re are favorable opp ort unities f or conclusion of a treaty by means
of appropr iate agree ment among t he Four Powers in Austria .
The Soviet Govern ment agre ed in the third of its state ment s at the
of $150,0 00,0 00
c::..c:·e:re::1
ce a t Berlin in 1954 to accept the equivalent
p:rovic:.ecl fo r by Article
35 of the Austrian Tre aty fully in the del.i.very
of Austri;: 1.n goods .
z~eSoviet Government declare d its readiness i n addition, for the
early fo rseen transfer
of former German pr operty in the Soviet zone of
occup ied Austria, to tran sfe r to Austria immediately after conclu si on of
the State Treaty, for pro per reco mpense, t he property of the Danube
Steamshipping Company (DDSG), i nclu di ng the ship yards and Korneuburg
d ock and all ve ss els and port installations
.

1New York Times , Apri l 16, 1955, p. 2.
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Oil Fields

to be Yielded

:'he Soviet Government agreed further to cede to Austria the oil
refineries,
including t he company for trade in oil products,
ORC?, defi. ~ed as belon ging to Austria in Article 35 of the State Treaty,
i n exchang e for the delivery of crude oil in amounts agreed to by t he

::.::..c..Lu.
S :ind

parties

;,

Moreover , agreement was reached to enter into negotiations
in the
nea r future aimed at normalization
of trade relations
between Austria
and the Sovie~ Union.
The Soviet Delegation informed the Austrian Dele gation that the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSRhad expressed its consent to
consider favorably the request of the Aust rian Federal President,
Dr.
Koer ne r, about the return of the Austrians to their motherland who are
servin g ter ms at the decision of the Soviet Court organ.
After the withdrawal of the Soviet occupation troops from Austria,
not a sin gle rrQlitary prisoner or detained civilian
person of Austrian
citizenship
,ri.11 remain on the territory
of the Soviet Union.
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TABLEI
NATIONALRATSWAHLEN
1945-19551
(Elections
to the National Assembly 1945-1955)
1.

ELECTIO
NS: NOVEMBER
1945

3,449,605 eligible voters
3,217,354 valid votes
OeVP

SPOe
KPOe

1,602,277 votes
1,434,898 votes
174,257 votes

85 seats
76 seats
4 seats

in the National rat
in the Nationalrat
in the Nati onal r at

• 5,972 votes

0 seats

in the Nati onalrat

e:::o cr at i c

?ar ty

.:..

ELECT
IONS: OCTOBER
1949

4,391,850 eligible voters 2
4,246,239 voted
4,189,366 valid votes
OeVP
SPOe
KPOe
Independents
3.

1 , 846,381
1,624,024
213,066
• 489,273

votes
votes
votes
votes

77
67
5
16

seats
seats
seats
seats

in
in
in
in

the
the
the
the

Nat ionalrat
Nat ionalrat
Nationalrat
Nationalrat

74 seats
73 seats

in
in
in
in

the
the
the
the

Nat ionalr at
Nationalrat
Nationalrat
Nati onalrat

ELECTIONS:FEBRUAiiY
1953
4,586,879 eligible voters
4,395,176 voted
4,319,274 valid votes
OeVP
SPOe

KPOe
Independents

litaet

1 , 781, 969
1 , 818, 811
228,228
• 473,022

votes
votes
votes
votes

4 seats

14 seats

1Heinrich Siegler , Oesterreic hs Weg ~ Souver aenitaet,
Neutr a1959),
, Prosper i tae t, ~ -1.2i2 (Wien: Verlag fuer Zeitarchieve,

pp . 16, 26, 32.

2At the first
elections
former members of the Heimwehr and of the
s~ur ~s char en (both paramilitary
organiza ti ons) were disqualified
from
v::iting due to their connections with Hitlerism .
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TABLEII
1
THE REORGANIZATION
OF THEAUSTRIANPOLICE FORCES

!•

KRIMI NALBEAMT
E (Criminal

Investigators)

1945
1953

1,235 men in t he service
• 1,425 men had entered the service
1,655 men had left the service

]1. VERWALTUN
GSDIENST DER POLIZEI (Administrative
1946
1953

••

Branch of the Police)

3,4 18 men in the service
1,081 men had entered the service
2,235 men had left

Q. SICHERH
EITSWACHE (Security

the service

Police)

1945

• 6,152 men in the service
.13,128 men had entered the service
13, 093 men had left the service

1953

TABLEIII
GER.MAN
OWNERSHIP
OF AUSTRIANCORPORATIO
NS I N 19442

Banks ••••...•..••

83 per cent
Insurance ••.••••••.
61 per cent
Smelting and VJ.ining .
• • 72 per cent
Machine and Metal •
64 per cent
Chemical
• 71 per ce..."1.t
Electric
••••
82 per cent
56 per cent
Construction
.••
Wood • • • • • •
• •
49 per cent
Textile •••••••••••
57 per cent
Transportation
• • • •
• 58 per cent
Oil.
• • • • • • •
• •• 50 per cent

1Adolf Schaerf,

Oesterreic hs Erneuerung, J..2.4i
-~
1956), P• 150.

(Wien:

Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchh andlung,
Austri a

2william L. Stearman, The Soviet Union and :!ill&.Occupation Qf
(Wien: Verlag fuer Zeitarchieve,
1957), P• 25.
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FIGUREII
2
DIVISION OF VIENNAINTO SECTORS
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